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ARTICLES

CONTROLLING DISCRETION BY
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS:
THE USE, MISUSE, AND NONUSE
OF POLICE RULES AND POLICIES
IN FOURTH AMENDMENT ADJUDICATION
Wayne R. LaFave *

In assaying fourth amendment jurisprudence, it is useful to take
into account available knowledge regarding the actual search and
seizure practices of the police. Especially helpful is the perspective
afforded by the American Bar Foundation's Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States, 1 which ranks as the preeminent empirical study of law enforcement procedures in this
country. Despite the fact - or, more likely, because of the fact that the ABF Survey was published over twenty years ago, certain
insights from that study highlight some recent and significant changes
in this corpus juris inconstans.
Clearly "the most important single finding of the Survey" was
"how hard it is to make accurate straightforward statements about
criminal law administration" because of the previously unperceived
"complexity"· of that process. 2 That complexity, the Survey established, attends activities of the police that implicate the fourth amendment. In deciding whether to make an arrest or other seizure of a
person and whether to search for or seize property, the police are in
* David C. Baum Professor of Law and Center for Advanced Study Professor of Law, Uni·
versity of Illinois. B.S. 1957, LL.B. 1959, S.J.D. 1965, University of Wisconsin. - Ed. I have
benefited greatly from the comments of Herman Goldstein, Lloyd Ohlin, Frank Remington, and
Victor Rosenblum. An abridged version of this article will later appear as a chapter in a book·
length retrospective on the American Bar Foundation's Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States.
1. The results of the Survey were published in five volumes. In chronological order by sub·
ject matter, they are: L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME:
STOPPING AND QUE5TIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT
(F. Remington ed. 1967); W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY (F. Remington ed. 1965); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A
SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (F. Remington ed. 1969); D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMl·
NATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (F. Remington ed. 1966); R. DAWSON,
SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDmONS OF SENTENCE (F. Remington ed. 1969).
2. Epilogue to the Survey, in F. MILLER, supra note l, at 351, 351-52.
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actuality called upon to make decisions which are quite varied in their
character and effect and which are influenced by a vast range of factors and considerations. 3
Because courts in the pre-Survey days did not perceive this complexity, the fourth amendment jurisprudence of that era was decidedly
one-dimensional. What Frank Allen has called "the process of 'factualization' in search and seizure cases"4 had barely begun, and consequently the Supreme Court's decisions during that period treated the
fourth amendment "as a monolith: whenever it restricts police activities at all, it subjects them to the same ... restrictions." 5 Illustrative is
Henry v. United States, 6 where FBI agents investigating a theft from
an interstate shipment kept suspect Pierotti and his companion Henry
under surveillance and saw them on two occasions loading cartons
from a private residence. The agents then stopped the vehicle in
which the two were riding and overheard Henry instruct Pierotti to
tell the agents that he (Pierotti) had "just picked me up." Over the
objection of the two dissenters that "this Court is not bound by the
Government's mistakes," 7 the Henry majority accepted the prosecution's inexplicable concession that the stopping of the car constituted
an "arrest," for which probable cause was lacking. That characterization made irrelevant "what transpired at or after the time the car was
stopped." 8
Henry stands in sharp contrast to the post-Survey decision in Terry
v. Ohio, 9 which expressly rejected the contention "that there is not and cannot be - a variety of police activity which does not depend
solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen and yet which
stops short of an arrest based upon probable cause to make such an
arrest." 10 Significantly, the Terry majority drew upon the findings of
the ABF Survey regarding the complexity of the stop-and-frisk activities of the police to support an important conclusion regarding the
application of the exclusionary rule to such conduct. Emphasizing
that "street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity" and "are initiated by the police for a wide variety
3. See generally w. LAFAVE, supra note 1; L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG,
supra note 1.
4. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L.
l, 4 (1950).
5. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 388 (1974).
6. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
7. 361 U.S. at 105 (Clark, J., and the Chief Justice, dissenting).
8. 361 U.S. at 104.
9. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10. 392 U.S. at 11.

REV.
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of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime," the Supreme Court concluded that not all such activity is
responsive to the exclusionary rule. Regardless of how effective the rule
may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed
rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other
goal.11

The Terry decision is admittedly somewhat unique, as not all the
Supreme Court's post-Survey fourth amendment decisions manifest a
comparable understanding of the complexity of the search and seizure
activities of the police. It is nonetheless a fair generalization that the
Court now has a much greater appreciation of this complexity than it
did at the time of Henry. Whether by examination of the now-available empirical data (as in Terry) or simply by virtue of the steady diet
of fourth amendment cases which followed in the wake of Mapp v.
Ohio, 12 allowing the Supreme Court to "see in the round rather than
the flat" 13 the fourth amendment conduct of the police, the Court now
understands how rich and varied this activity is in real life. Allen's
"process of 'factualization' " has moved forward in fourth amendment
jurisprudence; the Supreme Court is now much more willing to judge
discrete search or seizure activity on its own terms. 14
Yet another recurring theme in the ABF Criminal Justice Survey
concerns "the relatively wide discretion 15 that officials have in enforcing the criminal law." 16 Of particular interest here is that discretion in
the criminal process which prior to the Survey 17 had been least visible:
that exercised by police in determining when and how to enforce the
11. 392 U.S. at 13-14 (footnote omitted).
12. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
13. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON 263 (1960).
14. For further discussion of this development, see LaFave, Being Frank About the Fourth:
On Allen's ''Process of 'Factua/ization' in the Search and Seizure Cases," 85 MICH. L. REV. 427
(1986).

IS. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 4 (1969) ("A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of
action or inaction.").
16. Epilogue to the Survey, supra note 2, at 352.
17. In the years since the Survey, however, the matter of police discretion has been the subject of intense scrutiny in the literature. See, e.g., Discretion in Law Enforcement, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984, at 1. For a most useful selective bibliography on police discretion, listing approximately 150 reports, books, and articles, see Center, Police Discretion: A
Selected Bibliography, Discretion in Law Enforcement, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1984, at 303.
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law. 18 Much of that discretion has to do with determining how to
invoke the criminal process and when to use a variety of investigative
techniques, and thus falls within the realm of fourth amendment activity. Included here are such decisions as whether to undertake a custodial arrest, 19 whether to persist in that attempt by using force, 20
whether to stop a suspect for investigation,21 and whether to conduct a
search. 22
In the pre-Survey search and seizure decisions of the Supreme
Court, the Court was largely oblivious to the discretionary practices of
the police and the risks they posed to fourth amendment interests. Illustrative is Harris v. United States, 23 holding that FBI agents lawfully
searched defendant's entire apartment "incident to" his arrest there.
The Harris majority reassured that this was not "a case in which lawenforcement officers have entered premises ostensibly for the purpose
of making an arrest but in reality for the purpose of conducting a general exploratory search." 24 That comment, of course, overlooks the
fact that police routinely exercise discretion whether to arrest perpetrators at their home or elsewhere. Further, the choice in a particular
case to arrest at home, because it is readily explainable in terms of the
arrest purpose, could easily be legitimated even if primarily motivated
by the opportunity to "piggyback" onto the arrest another, far greater
fourth amendment intrusion - a full but warrantless search of the
dwelling. 25 The post-Survey decisions of the Supreme Court are not
consistently of a better sort; true, Harris has been overruled,26 but
other decisions with the vice of Harris can be found. 27 But at least the
term "police discretion" has now entered the Supreme Court's lexicon,28 and in recent years (as I discuss later in this article) the Court
has sometimes expressly recognized that limits ·upon that discretion
are essential to the protection of fourth amendment values.
Given the complex and discretionary character of police search
and seizure decisions, some limitations on this power are essential.
18. See generally w. LAFAVE, supra note 1; L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG,
supra note 1.
19. W. LAFAVE, supra note l, at 168-207.
20. Id. at 208-26.
21. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 1, at 5-94.
22. Id. at 95-205.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

33fU.S. 145 (1947).
331 U.S. at 153.
See generally W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 41-43.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
E.g.• New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987).
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The issue, however, is not discretion versus no discretion, but rather
how this discretion should be confined, structured and checked. As
Professor Kenneth Davis once put it: "Half the problem is to cut back
unnecessary discretionary power. The other half is to find effective
ways to control necessary discretionary power." 29 One important conclusion of the ABF Survey is that this bipartite challenge cannot be
completely and successfully met by the legislative and judicial
branches alone; the police themselves are perceived to have an important role to play. As the ABF Survey concludes, "police ought to acknowledge their exercise of discretion and reduce their enforcement
policies to writing and subject them to a continuing process of critical
re-evaluation. " 30
Over the twenty-five intervening years, this has occurred to an immeasurable but noticeable degree. 31 As one recent assessment put it:
"Historically, law enforcement investigative practices were informal
and seldom, if ever, reduced to writing. In the past few years this has
changed and now, increasingly, enforcement agencies record enforcement practices in written form, usually referring to the written statements as 'guidelines.' " 32 This accounts for yet another distinction
between pre-Survey and post-Survey fourth amendment jurisprudence:
only in the more recent era have courts sometimes considered police
regulations in ruling upon search and seizure issues.
For the reasons detailed in the next section, police rulemaking regarding their fourth amendment activities is a highly desirable undertaking. This being so, it is appropriate to consider whether or not the
29. K. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 51 (emphasis in original).
30. W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 513.
31. See H. GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 117 (1977) (noting "a number of police
agencies - most notably those in Washington, D.C., Dayton, Ohio, Madison, Wisconsin, and
Boston, Massachusetts - have embarked upon ambitious efforts to develop guidelines for their
personnel"); Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 LA w & CON·
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1971, at 500, 502 (on the District of Columbia's orders governing eyewitness identification of suspects and automobile searches); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good
Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70
GEO. L.J. 365, 399-400 (1981) (on the District of Columbia's regulations on traffic stops); Quinn,
The Effect ofPolice Rulemaking on the Scope ofFourth Amendment Rights, 52 J. URB. L. 25, 2627 n.9 (1974) (noting developments in D.C., San Diego, Dayton, Los Angeles, Memphis, and San
Antonio).
The rulemaking movement was advanced by the publication in 1974 of a series of pamphlets
containing Model Rules for Law Enforcement on a variety of topics. The pamphlet titles are:

Search Warrant Execution; Stop and Frisk; Wa"antless Searches ofPersons and Places; Searches,
Seizures and Inventories ofMotor Vehicles; Release ofArrest and Conviction Records; and Eyewit·
ness Identification. The Project's Advisory Board consisted of representatives of the police departments of Cincinnati; Dade County, Fla.; Dallas; Dayton; District of Columbia; Kansas City,
Mo.; Oakland; Phoenix; San Antonio; San Diego; and San Jose.
32. F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, H. GOLDSTEIN & W. DICKEY, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 153 (rev. ed. 1982).
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judicial branch has a part to play in that enterprise. The answer, quite
obviously, is yes: courts "have a role in stimulating this administrative
process and reviewing its products." 33 It is the performance to date of
this role by the courts (especially the Supreme Court) which constitutes the focus of this article. More specifically, I consider: To what
extent have the courts performed the "stimulating" function by mandating or encouraging police policymaking? To what extent have the
courts performed the "reviewing" function to ensure that law enforcement regulations accomplish the hoped for benefits of rulemaking?
And, more generally, precisely how has the existence or nonexistence
of police rules influenced the quality and character of fourth amendment jurisprudence?
I.

POLICE RULEMAKING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

"The police," Kenneth Davis once commented, "are among the
most important policy-makers of our entire society. And they make
far more discretionary determinations in individual cases than any
other class of administrators; I know of no close second." 34 As the
pervasiveness of this police discretion became more widely known,
there arose in many quarters the understandable concern that this vast
discretion must be limited and controlled. To accomplish this, many
have concluded, a system of rulemaking by law enforcement agencies
themselves is imperative. The case for rulemaking has been made by
many tho1:1ghtful commentators, including Judge Carl McGowan35
and Professors Anthony Amsterdam, 36 Herman Goldstein, 37 and
Kenneth Davis. 38 Rulemaking has been advocated in such law reform
efforts as the ALI's Pre-Arraignment Code39 and the ABA's Criminal
Justice Standards,40 and in such influential studies as those by the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
33. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights ofSuspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 785, 813 (1970).
34. K. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 222 (footnote omitted).
35. McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 10 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972).
36. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 409-39; Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 810-15.
37. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 106-26; Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1123 (1967); Goldstein, Trial Judges
and the Police, 14 CRIME & DELINQ. 14, 22-25 (1968).
38. K. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 52-161; K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 98-138 (1975).
39. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE

§ 10.3 (1975).
40. 1 AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE§ 1-4.3 (2d ed.
supp. 1986).
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Justice41 and the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals. 42 Consequently, this article need not establish
the need for development of guidelines by police agencies; it will suffice to summarize the case already made.
In some of this writing (especially that of Kenneth Davis), the emphasis is upon that police discretion related to the substantive criminal
law - that is, law enforcement decisions not to invoke the criminal
process against certain individuals who have apparently violated some
provision in the penal code. This is police discretion of the lowest
possible visibility, and it is a form of police discretion that traditionally
has not been a subject of judicial oversight and that, by its nature, does
not readily lend itself to such supervision. Given these circumstances,
it is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that meaningful reform
makes necessary resort to a regime of police rulemaking. 43 It may be
less apparent that the development of guidelines by the police themselves is essential with respect to their fourth amendment activities.
After all, at least since Mapp v. Ohio 44 the courts, through the mechanism of the exclusionary rule, have had the responsibility for defining
the fourth amendment limits of police power and for imposing the
suppression sanction when those limits have been exceeded. The exclusionary rule "assures a great deal of judicial attention"45 to such
police practices and thus has resulted in considerable judicial elaboration of fourth amendment requirements, 46 culminating in an "enormous increase in police training and education about constitutional
rights."47 Thus, police rulemaking might appear superfluous at best.
That is not the case, however. To appreciate this, it is helpful to
begin with an understanding that this traditional, virtually exclusive
reliance upon the judiciary for the formulation of fourth amendment
standards cannot be taken as an apodictic manifestation that courts
41. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 18-21 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
42. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMN. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, POLICE 21-28 (1973).
43. For the advantages of rulemaking in that context, see K. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 90-91.
44. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 255, 260 (1961).
46. Regarding the California experience, see Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty
States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 323; for the Illinois experience, see LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule - Part IL· Defining the Norms and Training the Police,
30 Mo. L. REV. 566, 580-81 n.63 (1965).
47. Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's Defense, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 28, 31
(1982).
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possess singular omniscience on these matters. To the contrary, as
Amsterdam has pointed out, this judicial activism
has been the almost inevitable consequence of the failure of other agencies of law to assume responsibility for regulating police practices. In
most areas of constitutional law the Supreme Court of the United States
plays a back-stopping role, reviewing the ultimate permissibility of dispositions and policies guided in the first instance by legislative enactments, administrative rules or local common-law traditions. In the area
of controls upon the police, a vast abnegation of responsibility at the
level of each of these ordinary sources of legal rulemaking has forced the
Court to construct all the law regulating the everyday functioning of the
police. 48

In the face of this phenomenon, there is no reason to doubt the contention that a "new allocation of responsibilities is required" and that the
role of the Supreme Court (and courts generally) "is better adapted to
review than to initiation."49 Indeed, that contention - which
presumes a process of administrative regulation at the police level makes especially good sense in the fourth amendment area.
The fourth amendment, whether viewed in terms of its preconstitutional history or its current interpretation by the Supreme Court, is
concerned with indiscriminate searches and seizures of two types: (i)
"unjustified searches and seizures," that is, those where "an adequate
justification" for such intrusion has not been shown; and (ii) "arbitrary
searches and seizures," that is, those "conducted at the discretion of
executive officials, who may act despotically and capriciously in the
exercise of the power to search and seize." 50 The first of these concerns is reflected in the explicit and familiar fourth amendment requirement of "probable cause," while the second is manifested by the
amendment's interpretation "as another harbinger of the Equal Protection Clause, concerned with avoiding indefensible inequities in
treatment." 51 Protection against arbitrary searches and seizures lies in
controlling police discretion, which requires a determination that the
police action taken against a particular individual corresponds to that
which occurs with respect to other persons similarly situated. Judicial
assessment of just what the category is (that is, who else really is "similarly situated") and whether or not like cases in fact receive the same
disposition will be more meaningful and reliable if the record in the
case reveals a preexisting police regulation on the subject.
48. Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 790.
49. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases,
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 542.
50. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 411.
51. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 97 (1980).
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A second characteristic of the fourth amendment is that the experience and expertise of the police, when adequately established in court,
is properly taken into account in determining the legality of the challenged police conduct. 52 A process of police rulemaking makes it possible for the experience and expertise of the entire department to be
focused upon the matter at issue and more effectively communicated
to the reviewing court. As Goldstein has noted, if police policy has
been made through a process of administrative rulemaking, then
in the review of police practices initiated by a motion to suppress evidence, a judge could promote a dialogue with the police by affording the
law-enforcement agency an opportunity to justify and explain the practice at issue, thereby focusing judicial review upon the legality and propriety of department policies rather than the actions of an individual
officer. This would give the police an opportunity to articulate the experience and expertise influential in formulating their policies - factors to
be considered in weighing the propriety of their actions. A judge fully
informed on all of the circumstances related to a given police practice is
obviously in a better position to pass judgment upon its legality and propriety than one whose knowledge of the procedure is limited to what is
revealed in the typical hearing on a motion to suppress evidence. 53

Yet another characteristic of the fourth amendment (or, more precisely, of its exclusionary rule) is that only certain types of police
search and seizure activity regularly come to the attention of the
courts. Because the exclusionary rule ordinarily may be invoked only
by a defendant in a criminal case, those police searches and seizures
which are undertaken for purposes other than prosecution or which do
not result in the discovery of evidence do not receive judicial scrutiny.
As acknowledged in Terry v. Ohio, 54 the exclusionary rule "is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the
police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo
successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal," a
not uncommon occurrence. 55 With respect to these practices, police
52. E.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975) ("officers are entitled to draw
reasonable inferences from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area and their prior
experience with aliens and smugglers").
53. Goldstein, Trial Judges and the Police, supra note 37, at 24 (footnote omitted).
54. 392 U.S. I, 14 (1968).
55. Illustrative are
arrest or confiscation as a punitive sanction (common in gambling and liquor law violations), arrest for the purpose of controlling prostitutes and transvestites, arrest of an intoxicated person for his own safety, search for the purpose of recovering stolen property, arrest
and search and seizure for the purpose of "keeping the lid on" in a high crime area or of
satisfying public outcry for visible enforcement, search for the purpose of removing weapons
or contraband such as narcotics from circulation, and search for weapons that might be used
against the searching officer.
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 721-22
(1970).
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rulemaking is needed not so much as an aid to judicial oversight but
rather (as with police nonenforcement decisions) because no other
meaningful restraint on the activity of individual officers exists. The
mere absence of routine judicial review of such activities does not
mean that any police regulations adopted would merely approve the
established practice. As Amsterdam warns, it is
a grave mistake ... to assume that all of the things that policemen do in
a state of rulelessness would continue to be done under a regime of rules.
Many practices now tolerated in individual cases ... would not be approved or authorized by the police command structure itself if it were
required to assume responsibility for determining the propriety of those
practices as a general mode of departmental operation. 56

Departmental policymaking regarding the fourth amendment activities of police is desirable because it "improves police performance"
in four major ways: (1) "Rulemaking enhances the quality of police
decisions" because it focuses attention on the fact that policy is being
made, promotes the placing of decisionmaking authority in responsible
and capable hands, increases the seriousness with which police confront the implications of their practices for the efficiency of law enforcement and the liberty of citizens, promotes decisionmaking
efficiency, and enhances police prestige and morale. (2) "Rulemaking
tends to ensure the fair and equal treatment of citizens" because rules
reduce the influence of bias, provide uniform standards for use in the
training of personnel, and serve both to guide and to control police
behavior. (3) "Rulemaking increases the visibility of police policy decisions" because the rulemaking process requires the departmental
command structure to learn what officers in the field are doing, and
informs other governmental agencies and the public about what the
police are doing. (4) "Rulemaking offers the best hope we have for
getting policemen consistently to obey and enforce constitutional
norms that guarantee the liberty of the citizen" because rules made by
the police are most likely to be obeyed by the police and, when not
obeyed, are most likely to be effectively enforced by the department. 57

II.

IMPOUNDMENTS AND INVENTORIES: THE BERTINE
"STANDARDIZED PROCEDURE" REQUIREMENT

In a series of cases culminating in Colorado v. Bertine, 58 the
Supreme Court has evaluated the reasonableness under the fourth
amendment of various police activities related to the impoundment or
56. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 421.
57. Id. at 423-28.
58. 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
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inventory of effects. In the first case, the Court declined to rely upon a
police regulation that did exist; 59 in the second, the Court relied upon
a regulation that actually did not exist; 60 but finally, in South Dakota
v. Opperman, 61 the Court appeared to rely somewhat upon a regulation that did exist. Defendant's car was towed to a city impound lot
after it received two overtime parking tickets while parked at the same
location over seven hours. An officer then inventoried the contents of
the car, discovering marijuana in the unlocked glove compartment.
The Court found the police conduct constitutional. Citing the two
earlier cases in support of the proposition that "this Court has consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing or
protecting the car and its contents,"62 the Court in Opperman upheld
the inventory as such a reasonable intrusion. But the Court intimated
that the existence of appropriate police regulations on the subject
might be a sine qua non. The Opperman plurality opinion put fonvard
the proposition "that inventories pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable," 63 and Justice Powell, concurring separately,
stressed that the inventory "was conducted strictly in accord with the
regulations of the Vermillion Police Department." 64
59. At issue in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), was the admissibility of the
robbery victim's vehicle registration card, found while an officer was securing defendant's im·
pounded car after it had been inventoried pursuant to a regulation of the D.C. police department.
By relying upon the district judge's findings "that the discovery of the card was not the result of a
search of the car, but of a measure taken to protect the car while it was in police custody," 390
U.S. at 236, the Court managed to avoid expressing any judgment about the police regulation or
its bearing on the legality of police action pursuant to the regulation.
60. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), after defendant crashed his vehicle into a
bridge abutment, police in that small Wisconsin community had the disabled car towed to a
private garage and then took defendant, who was drunk and incoherent, to a hospital. The local
police, believing that the defendant, a Chicago policeman, was required to carry his service re·
volver at all times, then went to the garage and searched the car parked outside for the weapon
and found evidence of a homicide. The Supreme Court, in rejecting the court of appeals' conclusion that it was an unreasonable search, emphasized both the searching officer's "specific motivation and the fact that the procedure he followed was 'standard.'" 413 U.S. at 443. The
motivation, "to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or
perhaps malicious hands," was deemed by the Court "as immediate and constitutionally reasonable as" that in Harris. 413 U.S. at 443, 447. The Court repeatedly stressed the officer's suppres·
sion hearing testimony that the effort to find the revolver was " 'standard procedure in our
department'," 413 U.S. at 437, but it was never explained precisely how this entered into the
fourth amendment equation. Nor was the standard procedure ever specifically stated or any
actual police regulation ever identified. The Court simply "assumed that the small Wisconsin
police department had an administrative policy on vehicle inventorying. In fact, no such policy
existed." F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, H. GOLDSTEIN & w. DICKEY, supra note
32, at 152.
61. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
62. 428 U.S. at 373.
63. 428 U.S. at 372.
64. 428 U.S. at 380 (Powell, J., concurring). In footnote 6, Justice Powell elaborated that
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Opperman was relied upon in Illinois v. Lafayette, 65 where the
Court upheld a stationhouse inventory of defendant's effects following
his arrest for disorderly conduct. Emphasizing an officer had testified
"it was standard procedure to inventory 'everything' in the possession
of an arrested person," the Court held "that it is not 'unreasonable' for
police, as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an
arrested person, to search any container or article in his possession, in
accordance with established inventory procedures." 66 Significantly,
Lafayette suggests that rulemaking at the police level is better suited
for dealing with certain fourth amendment activities of law enforcement officers. The Court cautioned that "it is not our function to
write a manual on administering routine, neutral procedures of the
station house," and that the Justices were "hardly in a position to second-guess police departments as to what practical administrative
method will best deter theft by and false claims against its employees
and preserve the security of the station house. " 67 These comments
responded to the lower court's assertion that a less intrusive policy (for
example, placing defendant's bag in a sealed locker) would suffice.
Then came Bertine where, after defendant's arrest for driving
under the influence, his van was inventoried prior to being towed to an
impoundment lot, resulting in the discovery of drugs in a backpack
found lying behind the back seat. The Court emphasized that in the
present case, "as in Opperman and Lafayette, ... the police ... were
following standardized procedures," 68 and then proceeded to declare,
much more clearly than had the Court's earlier decisions, the central
place of police rulemaking in the constitutional scheme: "We conclude that ... reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment,
even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise
equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure." 69 In rejecting the state court's conclusion that Bertine's fourth amendment
rights had been violated, the Court noted that both the impoundment
of Bertine's car and the opening of containers found in the car during
the inventory conformed with Boulder Police Department regulations.
To the extent that Bertine either encourages or compels police deunder these regulations all impounded vehicles are inventoried and the inventories always extend
to the glove compartment.
65. 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
66. 462 U.S. at 642, 648.
67. 462 U.S. at 647, 648.
68. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372. (1987).
69. 479 U.S. at 374.
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partments to engage in the promulgation of guidelines on the subjects
of impoundment and inventory of vehicles and other effects, it should
be applauded. Especially because (as Bertine notes) "an inventory
search may be 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment even though
it is not conducted pursuant to a warrant based upon probable
cause," 70 some significant protection in lieu of the two traditional
fourth amendment safeguards of probable cause and warrant is essential. As Justice Powell emphasized in his Opperman concurrence, to
protect against "arbitrary invasions by government officials" it is essential that "no significant discretion is placed in the hands of the individual officer" concerning "the subject of the search or its scope." 71
Thus, it is not sufficient that the challenged impoundment or inventory is of the kind undertaken by police departments generally, 72 nor is
it sufficient that it conforms to the particular officer's standard practice. 73 What is necessary, says Bertine, is that this officer was "following standardized procedures," which certainly can be most
convincingly proved by showing that the officer's actions conform to
"the established policy or procedures of the particular law enforcement agency." 74
Police rulemaking on this subject also permits more meaningful
input of police expertise. Given that what is at issue here is a "routine
practice" 75 which, as Bertine says, serves "to protect an owner's property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of
lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger,"76 it is appropriate to expect the police agency in the first instance
to make a judgment about exactly what kind of routine is needed to
70. 479 U.S. at 371.
71. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377, 384 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
72. As stated in United States v. Hellman, 556 F.2d 442, 444 (9th Cir. 1977):
The fact that other police departments routinely follow such a practice may give support to
the proposition that such a practice, iflocally followed, is reasonable. It does not, however,
render reasonable a search where the inventorying practice is not locally followed and the
search, thus, is a departure from local practice. A locally followed practice gives some
assurance that a particular car was not singled out for special searching attention.
73. As stated in People v. Long, 419 Mich. 636, 647, 359 N.W.2d 194, 199 (1984) (footnote
omitted) (quoting People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 467, 320 N.W.2d 866, 875 (1982) (Moody, J.,
concurring)):
Although the officer testified as to his personal "standard" procedure, this procedure does
not meet the requirements of reasonableness as suggested in Opperman. A standard departmental practice gives some assurance that the particular vehicle or part of the vehicle was
not singled out for a search based upon an improper motive. Without a departmental policy, too much discretion is placed in the hands of a police officer. His decision to search may
be an arbitrary one.
74. State v. Atkinson, 298 Or. 1, 10, 688 P.2d 832, 837 (1984).
75. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).
76. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987).
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serve those governmental interests in that particular locality. The result is not state-wide uniformity (as likely would be the case if the
matter were left entirely to the courts), but this is all to the good;
"different procedures might be appropriate for various circumstances
in different communities throughout the state." 77 Moreover, if the
process begins with policymaking by law enforcement agencies, then
the courts can perform a more appropriate role. As one state supreme
court put it:
·
It is not our function to decide as a matter of policy how, and for what
purpose, automobiles or other private property that come into official
custody should be examined. That is a matter for politically accountable
officials to decide by laws, ordinances, or delegations of rulemaking authority. Our role ... is to assure that such policies and procedures as are
adopted do not violate constitutional guarantees. 78

In the years prior to Bertine, lower courts took varied positions
concerning the existence or nonexistence of police department regulations on the subject of impoundment and inventory. At one extreme
was the view that "the fact such a search is made pursuant to a police
regulation should have no bearing in determining whether the search
is reasonable"; 79 at the other was the notion that to be lawful an inventory "must be made pursuant to established police regulations." 80 Between these extremes were cases in which regulations were not
mandated but, because they did exist and were placed in evidence,
were used to determine the lawfulness of the police conduct. That is,
the legality of the challenged impoundment or inventory was determined by whether the police conformed with81 or deviated from 82
those regulations. Bertine certainly rejects the first extreme, and
rightly so, but it is by no means apparent that the Supreme Court has
opted for the second extreme, which would require that "standardized
procedures" be established only by policies set out in writing in a police manual or standard operating procedure. In the recent case of
United States v. Frank, 83 the Third Circuit upheld an inventory that
77. Atkinson, 298 Or. at 6-7, 688 P.2d at 835, noting that state-wide uniformity imposed by
appellate courts might well be grounded in some mistaken assumptions. "For instance, a requirement that police attempt to contact the owner of each impounded vehicle before undertaking an inventory might presuppose that all law enforcement agencies have a uniform capability
that may or may not exist." 298 Or. at 7, 688 P.2d at 835.
78. Atkinson, 298 Or. at 6, 688 P.2d at 835.
79. United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 476 (8th Cir. 1973).
80. State v. Ruffino, 94 N.M. 500, 502, 612 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1980).
81. E.g., United States v. Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1982); People v. Trusty, 183 Colo.
291, 516 P.2d 423 (1973).
82. E.g., State v. Vernon, 45 N.C. App. 486, 263 S.E.2d 340 (1980); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d
264 (Utah 1985).
83. 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1989).
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conformed to "unwritten standard procedures" testified to by a police
lieutenant, though the department in question "had no written procedures governing inventory searches." 84 The Frank court declared:
"No Supreme Court case has ever held an inventory search invalid
because of the absence of formalized pre-existing standards." 85
This latter statement is unquestionably true, 86 and in defense of
Frank it might be asserted that Bertine does not even contain specific
dictum suggesting that if the procedures there had not been in writing
the result might be different. But, while Frank may in that sense be
"correct," it is doubtful that the conclusion reached there is a desirable one. In support of Frank, it might be argued that an inventory
should be upheld when, as in Madison v. United States, 87 although the
police department did "not have written guidelines for such searches,
the officer testified that he had been trained by his supervisors to perform inventory searches in this manner and he did so in accordance
with standard operating procedures." 88 But once it is accepted that
the Bertine "standardized procedures" can be established by police testimony about current practices rather than by proof of preexisting
written policies, there are dangers aplenty. As United States v. Lyons 89 said of such a situation: "It is far from clear that this sort of
vague, customary departmental 'policy' would satisfy the concerns expressed by the Court in Opperman. " 90 A primary concern, of course,
is the possibility of undetected arbitrariness, a risk which takes on
much greater proportions when the supposed "standardized procedures" are established only by the self-serving and perhaps inaccurate
oral statements of a police officer, and are not memorialized in the
department's previous written instructions to its officers. Another
concern, as reflected by the Lyons use of the word "customary," is that
what is represented as department policy may constitute nothing more
than a custom, hardly deserving the deference which an actual policy
84. 864 F.2d at 1002.
85. 864 F.2d at 1003.
86. It is still true after Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1635 (1990), for the Supreme Court
there held inventory of a suitcase found in a DWI arrestee's impounded car violated the fourth
amendment, given the state court's finding "that the Florida Highway Patrol had no policy
whatever with respect to the opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory
search."
87. 512 A.2d 279 (D.C. 1986).
88. 512 A.2d at 281.
89. 706 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
90. 706 F.2d at 334 n.22; see also People v. Dandrea, 736 P.2d 1211, 1212 n.3, 1218 n.14
(Colo. 1987) (where three officers testified about a certain department policy but "[n]o actual
police department manuals or directives were introduced into evidence," court need not decide
what "weight might be accorded such policy," as "no such policy was established in this case").
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receives pursuant to Bertine. One might hope, therefore, that other
courts will come to emulate the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, which recently held that the state constitution "requires the
exclusion of evidence seized during an inventory search not conducted
pursuant to standard police procedures, which procedures, from now
on, must be in writing."91
Although Bertine itself does not explicitly go this far, the Supreme
Court's opinion strongly encourages departments to adopt written policies. Given that Bertine does require "standardized procedures," a
matter on which the prosecution bears the burden of proof, 92 it benefits the police to have these procedures actually set out in a manual or
similar directive. This seems particularly apparent when one considers another aspect of Bertine not yet mentioned: as lower courts have
rather consistently concluded, 93 a majority of the Supreme Court
deems it "permissible for police officers to open closed containers in an
inventory search only if they are following standard police procedures
that mandate the opening of such containers in every impounded vehicle. "94 Establishing this kind of absolute, nondiscretionary policy is
likely to be especially difficult absent evidence in the form of written
policies. 95
The positive side of Bertine, then, is this encouragement of police
rulemaking concerning what the Court has sometimes called the
91. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 402 Mass. 449, 451, 523 N.E.2d 779, 780 (1988).
92. United States v. Judge, 846 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1988).
93. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 764 P.2d 530, 533 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Harmon v. State,
748 P.2d 992, 994 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah App.
1988).
94. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1987). This language is from the three-Justice
concurrence. The two dissenters surely would settle for nothing less. The position of the remaining four members of the Court is unclear, although they joined the opinion of the Court in which
some emphasis was placed upon the fact that "the Police Department's procedures mandated the
opening of closed containers and the listing of their contents." 479 U.S. 374 n.6.
In the post-Bertine case of Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1635 (1990), there appears this
contrary statement: "A police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a
particular container should or should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and
characteristics of the container itself." But this language is only dictum; the Court in Wells held
that the challenged container inventory violated the fourth amendment because the inventorying
police agency "had no policy whatever with respect to the opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory search." 110 S. Ct. at 1635. The language first quoted was strongly
objected to by four members of the Court. Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring, interpreted Bertine as "premised on the city's inventory policy that left no discretion to individual
officers as to the opening of containers," 110 S. Ct. at 1639; Justice Blackmun, whose opinion
Justice Stevens agreed with, noted there was "no reason for the Court to say anything about
precisely how much, if any, discretion an individual policeman constitutionally may exercise,"
110 S. Ct. at 1639 (emphasis in original).
95. See Johnson, 764 P.2d at 533, and Harmon, 748 P.2d at 992, where such proof was
presented. Cf. State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah App. 1988) (though search of closed
containers is consistent with the purposes of inventory, such search held invalid here because
Utah Highway Patrol order "is silent on y.rhether closed containers should be opened").
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"community caretaking functions" of the police, 96 an area in which
both the availability of law enforcement expertise and the need to restrict discretion makes such administrative action especially appropriate. But Bertine has a negative side as well, and it concerns judicial
evaluation of relevant police regulations. While these regulations are
entitled to some deference from the courts, there are limits. "Obviously, a policy of deferring to administrative regulations could have
undesirable consequences, if the deference were carried too far: constitutional protections would be at the mercy of the most intrusively
imaginative police chief or jail administrator." 97 And that is why the
Court cautiously stated in Bertine that it was only "reasonable" police
regulations which satisfied the fourth amendment.
In Bertine, the defendant argued "that the inventory search of his
van was unconstitutional because departmental regulations gave the
police officers discretion to choose between impounding his van and
parking and locking it in a public parking place." 98 Before noting and
assessing the Court's response to that contention, it is important first
to emphasize the significance of the issue raised. The defendant focused attention upon the police rule regarding impoundment rather
than inventory, but this lessens not one iota the necessary judicial concern, as a fourth amendment matter, with the reasonableness of the
challenged regulation. The essential point is that the "legal validity of
the inventory depends upon the lawfulness of the underlying impoundment"99 or other form of police custody. 100 "Obviously, there is no
need to perform the caretaking function of an inventory when the vehicle is not in the care, custody, and control of the police." 101 And
this means there is an equivalent need for a discretion-limiting rule
applicable to both police decisions - whether to take custody of the
vehicle, and then whether to inventory it (or, in fourth amendment
terms, whether to "seize" and whether to "search"). A regime that
has very specific rules governing when an impounded vehicle may be
96. Cady v. Dombrowksi, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
97. State v. Ridderbush, 71 Or. App. 418, 425, 692 P.2d 667, 672 (1984).
98. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987).
99. State v. Kuster, 353 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Iowa 1984) (citing many cases from other
jurisdictions).
100. Noting that in South Dakota v. Opperman the Supreme Court discussed the lawfulness
of inventory of "automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody," 428 U.S. 364,
373 (1976), the court in State v. Stalder, 231 Neb. 896, 899-900, 438 N.W.2d 498, 501 (1989),
decided that a formal impoundment was not an inevitable prerequisite to inventory.
101. Caplan v. State, 531 So. 2d 88, 90 (Fla. 1988) (holding, consequently, that there was no
police right of inventory when the defendant merely asked the assistance of the police in summoning a tow truck for his disabled vehicle, for the car was not "impounded or otherwise placed
in police control").
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inventoried but permits officers substantial discretion concerning
whether to impound in the first place is just as threatening to fourth
amendment values as a regime that carefully circumscribes the impoundment decision but leaves the police broad latitude regarding
which impounded cars will be inventoried.
In response to the defendant's contention in Bertine, the opinion of
the Court states:
Nothing in Opperman or Lafayette prohibits the exercise of police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria
and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity. Here, the discretion afforded the Boulder police was exercised in light of standardized criteria, related to the feasibility and
appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle rather than impounding
it. There was no showing that the police chose to impound Bertine's van
in order to investigat~ suspected criminal activity. 102

This is a most inadequate response which, unfortunately, fails to recognize the precise function that reviewing courts must perform in a
system which relies upon police rulemaking to contribute meaningfully to the protection of fourth amendment rights.
For one thing, the passage quoted above fails even to recognize
why police regulations providing "standardized procedures" are important in such areas of fourth amendment activity as impoundment
and inventory. Their purpose in the fourth amendment scheme of
things, as Justice Powell succinctly put it in his Opperman concurrence, is "to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by government officials." 103 "Arbitrary" action is
that "depending on choice or discretion" and "arising from unrestrained exercise of the will, caprice, or personal preference," 104 and
thus is hardly limited to those situations where (in the language of
Bertine) the police acted on "suspicion of evidence of criminal activity." That is simply a matter of motivation, but it is the fact of deviation from established practice or the erratic action due to the
nonexistence of an established practice that is an appropriate object of
fourth amendment concern. If my car is impounded when others' are
merely parked, if my car is inventoried when others' are merely secured, or if the containers in my car are.opened in inventorying when
others' are not, then - absent good reason for singling me out - my
privacy and security have been improperly intruded upon whether it is
suspicion of criminal activity or any of a myriad of other reasons
which accounts for my different treatment.
102. 479 U.S. at 375-76 (footnote omitted).
103. 428 U.S. at 377.
104. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 110 (1981).
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Moreover, the Bertine palliative that there "was no showing that
the police chose to impound Bertine's van in order to investigate suspected criminal activity" likewise misrepresents the function of police
rulemaking. It makes Bertine appear as a case in which the issue was
simply whether the defendant had proved he had been the victim of a
pretext or subterfuge search - one purported to be for one reason but
in fact motivated by another. But, as I explain later, 105 proving police
motivation is a most difficult and seldom successful undertaking, and
consequently it is a rather precarious device upon which to hang
fourth amendment rights. Although arbitrariness can occur for a variety of reasons, the nature of police responsibilities makes especially
acute both the risk that supposedly routine noninvestigative activities
will be commenced only because of an investigative purpose and the
risk that this motivation will never be exposed to the light of day.
That is precisely why discretion-limiting police regulations are needed
regarding impoundment and inventory: to restrict severely the opportunities for undetected (and perhaps undetectable) subterfuge to influence search and seizure decisions. Thus, the Court in Bertine should
not have said, in effect, that the defendant's failure to prove an investigative purpose made unnecessary any assessment of the breadth and
precision of the applicable police regulations. Rather, the Court
should have asked whether those regulations sufficiently confined police discretion so as to provide reasonable assurance against seizures
and searches undertaken for reasons unknown to the victims of these
intrusions and unknowable to the courts. 106 Only the dissenters in
Bertine appreciated this point.101
105. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
106. As one court applying Bertine noted, judicial efforts to discern police motivations are
bound to fail, as "our human limitations do not allow us to peer into a police officer's 'heart of
hearts.' " United States v. Judge, 864 F.2d 1144, 1147 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989).
107. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, cogently noted:
In both Opperman and Lafayette, the Court relied on the absence of police discretion in
determining that the inventory searches in question were reasonable.... In assessing the
reasonableness of searches conducted in limited situations such as these, where we do not
require probable cause or a warrant, we have consistently emphasized the need for such set
procedures: "standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned
when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent." ...
Inventory searches are not subject to the warrant requirement because they are conducted by the government as part of "community caretaking" function, "totally divorced
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a
criminal statute." Standardized procedures are necessary to ensure that this narrow exception is not improperly used to justify, after the fact, a warrantless investigative foray. Accordingly, to invalidate a search that is conducted without established procedures, it is not
necessary to establish that the police actually acted in bad faith, or that the inventory was in
fact a "pretext." By allowing the police unfettered discretion, Boulder's discretionary
scheme, like the random spot checks in Delaware v. Prouse, is unreasonable because of the
"grave danger" of abuse of discretion.
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 377-78, 381 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (quoting
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Given the Court's erroneous frame of reference in Bertine, it is by
no means surprising that the challenged Boulder police regulation
which passed muster in that case falls significantly short of performing
its fourth amendment function of limiting police discretion. As the
two dissenters point out, this police directive (never quoted by the majority) states the police may tum the car over to a third party, park it
in a nearby public parking lot and merely lock it, or impound and
inventory. And, as the dissenters further emphasized, the officer in
this case testified that decisions regarding these alternatives "were left
to the discretion of the officer on the scene." 108 To thjs, the Bertine
majority lamely responds that the regulations ~·establish[ ] several conditions that must be met before an officer may pursue the park and
lock altemative," 109 thus ignoring that the limitations so stated confine
not at all the individual officer's power to opt for the impoundmentinventory alternative.
It is possible, and certainly most desirable, to give deference to police regulations - as in Bertine, to acknowledge that such a regulation
is not unreasonable merely because "courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different
procedure" 110 - yet also to require that those regulations impose realistic limits on police discretion. The point is not that the regulations
must totally eliminate discretion, for that is impossible. "[A]s a practical matter, the exercise of some discretion by agents, even if only
interpretive, is inevitable since no manual can reasonably be expected
to spell out in detail the correct action in light of the almost infinite
array of objects an agent may encounter."lll Thus, even under the
Bertine concurrence's rule that "it is permissible for police officers to
open closed containers in an inventory search only if they are following standard police procedures that mandate the opening of such containers in every impounded vehicle," 112 a carefully drawn police
regulation will inevitably require officers sometimes to decide, for example, "whether an object constitutes a 'container.' "11 3
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973))
(citations omitted). Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), is discussed infra in the text accompanying note 163.
108. 479 U.S. at 381 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
109. 479 U.S. at 376 n.7.
110. 479 U.S. at 374.
111. United States v. Judge, 864 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir. 1989).
112. 479 U.S. at 376-77.
113. United States v. Judge, 864 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir..1989), where the court also
commented:
The determination of what constitutes a container is inherently discretionary. Suppose,
for instance, that an agent finds a shaving kit inside a car. If the agent concludes that the
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Rather, the question is whether or not the challenged police regulations impose realistic limits on discretion. As the Bertine Court
highlighted by reaffirming Lafayette's refusal to adopt an "alternative
'less intrusive' means" test, one way to limit discretion is by not even
trying to draw lines which, in practice, might be misinterpreted; instead, discretion could be limited by requiring the same police respo11:se to a broad category of cases. This is exactly the focus of the
Bertine concurrence: it might be possible to draft and defend a more
selective rule than that of requiring police to open all closed containers
in all impounded vehicles, 114 but the virtue of the broader policy is
that it "promotes a certain equality of treatment. With a standardized, mandatory procedure, the minister's picnic basket and grandma's
knitting bag are opened and inventoried right along with the biker's
tool box and the gypsy's satchel." 115 Also, a rule of this broader type
may often by its very nature provide us with some assurance that the
policymaking police officials carefully balanced the competing interests. As "the cost of law enforcement is more widely distributed, ...
there is less reason to fear that the governmental decisions to trade off
privacy for law enforcement are being made without considering
everyone's interests equally." 116 And thus we are more likely to accept the police conclusion that the various objectives of the inventory
process can be achieved only by looking inside closed containers when
we find that they even intend to look in "the minister's picnic basket
and grandma's knitting bag."
It thus appears that an impoundment rule of the broader type, igshaving kit is a container, he is bound to open it and inventory its contents. However, if the
agent determines for some reason that the kit is not a container, he may not open it, and
must list it on the inventory sheet as merely a "shaving kit." Suppose, though, that our
hypothetical DEA agent decided that the kit was a container and proceeded to open it,
discovering inside among other articles a can of shaving cream and a tube of toothpaste. Is
the can of shaving cream a container subject to being opened for an inventory? What about
the tube of toothpaste? It all depends on the meaning the DEA agent accords to the word
"container," which involves an exercise of discretion.
114. Especially if the somewhat narrower rule did not confer unnecessary discretion. In the
Wells case, discussed in supra note 94, Justice Blackmun opined that under Bertine a state could,
for example, "adopt a policy which requires the opening of all containers that are not locked,"
see, e.g., Johnson v. State, 764 P.2d 530 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Harmon v. State, 748 P.2d 992
(Okla. Crim. App. 1988), but yet strongly criticized the majority's "language, unnecessary on the
facts of this case, concerning the extent to which a policeman, under the Fourth Amendment,
may be given discretion in conducting an inventory search." Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632,
1638-39 (1990).
115. State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 428 {Utah Ct. App. 1988).
116. Wasserstrom & Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 71 GEO.
L.J. 19, 95 (1988). As Justice Jackson, concurring in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949), put it, "nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively ns to
allow [municipal] officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and
thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were
affected."
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noring the tum-over-to-friend and park-at-scene alternatives, is a permissible police regulation. This is not to suggest, however, that a
police rule cannot be unreasonable because of excessive breadth. Certainly "a general policy that at any time when there is a felony arrest
the vehicle was to be seized," even when the arrestee was not in or by
the vehicle and even when "the vehicle was parked at the defendant's
residence, at a motel or restaurant parking lot, or at some other place
indicating little need for impoundment for safekeeping purposes," 117 is
vulnerable. Nor does this suggest that responsible policymaking at the
police level will not sometimes result in the drafting of narrower rules
or those requiring decisionmaking by officers on the scene. An impoundment rule might well deal with the tum-over-to-friend and parkat-scene alternatives. As recent cases discussing and upholding such
provisions make apparent, 118 rules can be drafted so that - unlike the
Boulder regulation in Bertine - police are advised about those circumstances in which they must forgo resort to the impooodment
alternative.
Of course, even if the regul~tion sufficiently reduces the need for
discretion in the field, the rule must draw sensible distinctions. One
would expect courts to be more likely to second-guess the police
rulemakers when it appears, for example, that the impoundment alternative is mandated for a group less likely to be aple to influence politically the making or revision of rules. This explains State v. Crosby, 119
invalidating a regulation permitting only family members to take possession of arrestees' vehicles. The court explained:
In a university community, particularly where an arrest is made near the
university, such a policy is certainly suspect in that it imposes a burden
on out of town students who have no family members available. Thus
the suspicion is raised that the policy is intended only as subterfuge for a
warrantless search without probable cause. 120
·
III. INSPECTIONS: THE CAMARA "REASONABLE .••
ADMINISTRATIVE STANDARDS" REQUIREMENT

In Camara v. Municipal Court, 121 the Court held that city officials
ordinarily must obtain a search warrant to conduct an unconsented
housing inspection. In reaching this conclusion, the majority empha117. State v. Kuster, 353 N.W.2d 428, 432 (Iowa 1984).
118. E.g., Johnson v. State, 764 P.2d 530 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Harmon v. State, 748
P.2d 992 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
119. 403 So. 2d 1217 (La. 1981).
120. 403 So. 2d at 1220.
121. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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sized that the fourth amendment interests involved were more than
"peripheral," that the protections of the warrant process would ensure
that householders were not left "subject to the discretion of the official
in the field," and that there was no basis for concluding that "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search." 122 But, while Camara required that absent a
genuine emergency a search warrant be obtained for a housing inspection, this turned out to be a very special kind of warrant.
Camara marks the origin of a most important fourth amendment
doctrine - the so-called balancing test under which certain discrete
investigative and enforcement practices constituting "searches" or
"seizures" are permitted upon less than the traditional quantum of
probable cause. By "balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails," 123 the Court in Camara held that housing
' inspection warrants did not require probable cause in the sense in
which that phrase previously had been used in the fourth amendment
lexicon. Rejecting the appellant's claim that an inspection is constitutionally permissible only "when the inspector possesses probable cause
to believe that a particular dwelling contains violations of the minimum standards prescribed by the code being enforced," 124 the Court
held that reasonable standards based upon such factors as the passage
of time, the nature of the building, and the condition of the entire area
would suffice. Thus, concluded the Court, probable cause for a warrant exists in this special context "if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular dwelling."12s
The business inspection counterpart of Camara is Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 126 which involved the constitutionality of a broad warrantless inspection provision of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act. 127 Because the Court was "unconvinced ... that requiring war122. 387 U.S. at 530, 532, 533.
123. 387 U.S. at 537.
124. 387 U.S. at 534.
125. 387 U.S. at 538.
126. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
127. This provision permitted inspectors, without a warrant,
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment,
construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by an
employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable
times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment and· all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and
materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent, or
employee.
29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1990).
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rants to inspect will impose serious burdens on the inspection system
or the courts," 128 it held the warrantless inspection provision violated
:the fourth amendment. As for the grounds to obtain the requisite
business inspection warrant, the majority in Barlow's followed the
Camara approach:
A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an
OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example,
dispersion of employees in various types of industries across a given area,
and the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of the
area, would protect an employer's Fourth Amendment rights. 129

It may appear at first blush that all this is only remotely relevant to
the more particularized focus of this article, police rules and policies.
After all, Camara and Barlow's were concerned with inspections not
by police but by housing and OSHA inspectors, respectively. But, as
the Supreme Court more recently held in New York v. Burger, 130 the
special body of fourth amendment law that has developed on the subject of inspections applies even when police are called upon to do the
inspecting and when more traditional law enforcement concerns account in part for the inspection program. 13 1
Camara and Barlow's are striking examples of the Supreme Court's
recognition of how a regime of administrative plus judicial decisionmaking, drawing upon the special advantages of each, can contribute
to both the protection of fourth amendment rights and the advancement of legitimate government interests. As a closer look at the
Camara-Barlow's warrant scheme demonstrates, the Court's system of
promulgation of "administrative standards" and judicial review of
contemplated application of those standards, permits the full use of
expertise at the enforcement level. It also affords considerable assurance against abuse of discretion by those planning and conducting
inspections.
Housing inspection programs have traditionally involved adminis128. 436 U.S. at 316.
129. 436 U.S. at 321.
130. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
131. Burger involved a statutory inspection scheme for automobile dismantlers. The state
court had decided that the "fundamental defect in the statutes before us is that they authorize
searches undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality and not to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme." People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d 338, 344, 493 N.E.2d 926, 929, 502
N.Y.S.2d 702, 705 (1986). The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning "that a State can address a
major social problem [e.g., auto theft] both by way of an administrative scheme and through
penal sanctions." New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712 (1987). As for the fact that police
were used to conduct the inspections, the court held this did not make any difference either, as
"many States do not have the resources to assign the enforcement of a particular administrative
scheme to a specialized agency." 482 U.S. at 717.
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trative decisionmaking. Administrators have selected properties for
inspection when there are insufficient personnel to conduct a periodic
inspection of all designated buildings, and have adjusted the period
between inspections according to different rates of neighborhood deterioration.132 Camara obviously recognizes the need for such discretion in the first instance in a sensibly administered inspection system.
But, are these decisions now to be reviewed by the magistrate? Is he to
determine the wisdom of once-a-year inspections throughout the community? Is the magistrate to pass upon the soundness of a particular
neighborhood inspection plan? Although it frequently has been asserted that a judicial officer is not in a position to perform such a function, 133 the responsibilities of the magistrate here are not made
absolutely clear in Camara. In the branch of the opinion dealing with
the grounds for an inspection warrant, the Court says that the special
type of probable cause needed for inspections exists "if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection
are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling." 134 This strongly
suggests that the judicial officer has two responsibilities: (1) a general
determination of the reasonableness of the inspection program; and (2)
a specific determination of whether the particular inspection requested
fits within that program. Yet, in the part of Camara imposing the
search warrant requirement, the Court seems to assume that judicial
review of the grounds for inspection will occur "without any reassessment of the basic agency decision to canvass an area." 135 PostCamara appellate litigation about housing inspections is sufficiently
rare that no statement can be made about how courts generally believe
this ambiguity in Camara should be resolved, although at least some
authority supports the conclusion that the magistrate should determine whether the administrative program is itself "reasonable."136
The Camara requirement that the warrant-issuing judicial officer
must determine that the requested inspection falls within existing legislative or administrative standards is intended as a check upon arbitrary searches. It responds to the Camara majority's stated concern
that a warrantless inspection system would "leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field" 137-that, as some of
132.
133.
COLUM.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 18 HARV. L. REV. 801, 807 (1965).
Comment, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment - A Rationale, 65
L. REV. 288, 291 (1965); Recent Cases, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 276 (1959).
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
387 U.S. at 532.
City of Seattle v. Leach, 29 Wash. App. 81, 627 P.2d 159 (1981).
387 U.S. at 532.
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the justices put it earlier, inspections may otherwise be "based on caprice or.on personal or political spite" 138 or be conducted "only [as] a
front for the police ...." 139 Once again the scarcity of post-Camara
appellate litigation does not permit a general statement as to precisely
how or how effectively this has worked out. It does seem clear, however, as at least one court has insisted, that for this function of the
warrant process to be performed the magistrate must be given details
about the nature of the inspection program under which the warrant is
being sought, for only then can the magistrate determine whether "the
desired inspection fits within that program." 140 Had the Camara majority made that point more clearly, they would have blunted the dissenters' objection that the majority's scheme contemplated nothing
more than "warrants issued by the rubber stamp of a willing
magistrate." 141
Barlow's, the business inspection case, seems to clarify that the
warrant-issuing magistrate is to perform the two functions mentioned
above. The Barlow's holding, again, was that a
warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA
search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement
of the Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion
of employees in various types of industries across a given area, and the
desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of the area,
would protect an employer's Fourth Amendment rights.142
Such a warrant, the Court added, "would provide assurances from a
neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution,
is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria." 143 The determination of "neutral criteria" requires some review of the plan itself, while the "pursuant to"
limitation requires a judicial determination that the contemplated inspection falls within that plan.
If the benefits of the Barlow's warrant system are to be realized,
there must exist a fairly specific legislative or administrative plan
against which to judge the individual inspection contemplated. The
point is illustrated by State ex rel. Accident Prevention Division of
138. Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 271 (1960).
139. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 242 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
140. City of Seattle v. Leach, 29 Wash. App. 81, 84, 627 P.2d 159, 162 (1981) (quoting In re
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 587 F.2d 12, 14-15 (7th Cir. 1978)); see also 29 Wash. App. at 85, 627
P.2d at 162 (holding insufficient a warrant issued on the basis of an affidavit which merely asserted that the intended inspection was part of "a regular building inspection which is conducted
for all buildings").
141. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 548 (Clark, J., dissenting).
142. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978).
143. 436 U.S. at 323.
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Workmen's Compensation Board v. Foster, 144 where a warrant was issued upon a showing that the inspection was "routine" and that the
premises in question had not been inspected for a certain period of
time. The applicable statute said that "cause shall be deemed to exist
if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting a
routine, periodic or area inspection are satisfied with respect to the
particular place of employment." The court found the statute unobjectionable but nonetheless held the warrant invalid because no standards had been promulgated indicating "the manner of selection of the
premises to be searched." 145 Unfortunately, not all appellate courts
are true to the spirit of Barlow's in this respect.146
Even more unfortunate is that in practice, the potential for protect. ing the fourth amendment rights of b~sinesses through a process of
judicially reviewed administrative regulation has been largely unrealized because of another development and its curious ramifications.
The development concerns the question of when a business inspection
is constitutional absent a warrant. In this area, as in other branches of
fourth amendment law, truly exigent circumstances arise in which it
would make no sense to insist that a warrant be obtained prior to the
search. But in the business inspection field there has been a tendency
to overstate what circumstances are in fact "exigent." Donovan v.
Dewey 147 is illustrative. Starting with the congressional finding that
safety hazards in mines can be concealed easily, the Court took this to
mean that "unannounced, even frequent, inspections" were necessary,
which in turn led the Court to the conclusion that therefore a warrant
requirement would "frustrate inspection." 148 But if, as the Court earlier noted in Barlow's, a need for frequent inspections does not mean
frequent search warrant applications, because most businessmen will
cooperate and permit the inspection when the inspector first appears
sans warrant, then it is still not apparent that a warrant requirement,
limited to the few cases in which the inspector is turned away, would
"frustrate" the program. And as for those few, the asserted need for
"unannounced" inspections cannot be taken seriously given that the
legislative scheme builds delay and notice requirements into the in144. 31 Or. App. 291, 570 P.2d 398 (1977).
145. 31 Or. App. at 298, 570 P.2d at 401.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Voorhies, 663 F.2d 30 (6th Cir. 1981) (although legislation
itself did not provide specific guidelines and defined probable cause only as "a valid public interest in the effective enforcement of this subchapter," and despite no showing of an administrative
plan as to how to proceed, warrant application deemed sufficient because it said the particular
premises had not been searched before).
147. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
148. 452 U.S. at 603.
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spection process. 149 Cases such as Dewey are troublesome because it
appears that the actual feasibility of obtaining a warrant has little or
nothing to do with whether a fourth amendment warrant requirement
is recognized.
As exemplified by other areas of fourth amendment law, 150 the
· grounds-for-search requirement ought not somehow vanish simultaneously with the warrant requirement. Thus the absence of a business
inspection warrant requirement does not diminish the need for a
grounds-for-search standard, for it is still important that the inspector
have a basis for assessing what it is the inspector may do, and that a
magistrate in a suppression hearing have a basis on which to judge the
lawfulness of the inspection. But this logical proposition finds little
support in the Supreme Court's warrantless inspection cases.
Although the Court in Dewey does not expressly state that the fact
"unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential" also foreCloses inquiry into why the inspector chose this business on this occasion, the implication is that it does, for the Court insists it is not
dealing with an inspection scheme that (as in Barlow's) confers "almost unbridled discretion" 151 upon the inspectors. But in fact, the
statutory scheme upheld in Dewey does not impose any limits on mine
inspectors regarding when or how often any particular mine will be
inspected, 152 and thus there remains a need for an administrative plan.
This is equally true of Burger, holding warrantless inspections conducted by police lawful because the "statute informs the operator of a
vehicle dismantling business that inspections will be made on a regular
149. The Act forbids use of force when entry is refused and instead requires that the Secretary of Labor in such instance go to court and seek an injunction against future refusal. Thus, in
Dewey the legislative determination of "the notorious ease with which many safety or health
hazards may be concealed," S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3401, 3427, cannot be taken to mean that Congress decided
that any delay or advance notice of inspections would undercut the Act's objectives, as the Act
itself requires delay and notice (i.e., resort to injunction proceedings) whenever a mine owner
turns the inspector away. That is, the factor relied upon in Barlow's to support the conclusion
that there was no need for unconsented warrantless inspections is now relied upon in Dewey as a
reason for upholding a warrantless inspection scheme.
150. Illustrative is the doctrine of California v. Camey, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), which generally
permits the search of vehicles without a search warrant, but changes not at all the requirement
that such searches for evidence of crime be made upon the traditional quantum of probable
cause.
151. 452 U.S. at 601, 603.
152. The statute, 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1988), requires inspection of all surface mines at least
twice annually, and all underground mines at least four times annually. It can hardly be said, as
the Court claims in Dewey, that "the Act ..• specifically defines the frequency of inspection," 452
U.S. at 603-04, as it merely sets a lower limit, and in practice the frequency might substantially
exceed the minimum. See, e.g., Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 47
(S.D. Ohio 1973) (three mines visited on 465 of 715 work days during two-year period).
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basis." 153 The truth of the matter, however, as the three dissenters
pointed out, is this:
Neither the statute, nor any regulations, nor any regulatory body, provides limits or guidance on the selection of vehicle dismantlers for inspection. In fact the State could not explain why Burger's operation was
selected for inspection. . . . This is precisely what was objectionable
about the inspection scheme [in Barlow~]: It failed to "provide any standards to guide inspectors either in their selection of establishments to be
searched or in the exercise of their authority to search."154
Because the no-warrant holding has typically been grounded in the
need for "unannounced, even frequent, inspections," perhaps the majority in cases like Dewey and Burger assume that in such circumstances the Barlow's neutral plan approach simply does not apply. So
the argument might go, if the inspection scheme requires "frequent"
inspections at the businesses covered, then there is already such a pervasive degree of scrutiny and control that it is unnecessary to impose a
limitation intended merely as a check against arbitrary selection or
concentration. But surely this is not so. For example, even accepting
the correctness of the holding in Dewey that no warrant is ever required for a mine safety inspection, it hardly follows that a particular
mine operator may be subjected to, say, ten times as many inspections
as his competitors without the government at any point being required
to justify this degree of attention. The Supreme Court needs to say so
and, in the process, to restore law enforcement policymaking to its
rightful place in federal, state and local inspection activities.
IV.

STOPS: BY "PLAN" OR BY "PROFILE"

Among the landmarks in fourth amendment jurisprudence is the
"stop-and-frisk" case of Terry v. Ohio. 155 Prior to Terry, courts were
inclined to take a monolithic view of the fourth amendment, classifying and treating all seizures of the person in exactly the same way.
Such acts were "arrests," and consequently could be made only upon
the traditional quantum of probable cause. But in Terry the Court
utilized the Camara balancing test to support the conclusion that a
brief detention on the street for investigation is much less intrusive
than a full-fledged stationhouse arrest and consequently is sometimes
permissible even absent grounds to make an arrest. From Terry
emerged the new issue of what facts and circumstances would justify a
153. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 711 (1987).
154. 482 U.S. at 723 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 601
(1981)).
155. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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brief detention on the street. Terry also recognized that what it called
"street encounters" constituted a low visibility activity utilized for a
variety of purposes and readily subject to abuse, including "wliolesale
harassment [of minorities] by certain elements of the police community .... " 156 The case therefore gave rise to special "concern over the
need to structure the officer's exercise of discretion," 157 which quite
naturally leads to the question of whether courts have perceived police
guidelines as being essential or useful to the task of determining when
a Terry stop is permissible.
Terry itself contains no hints about the apposition of police rules
and policies to the just-emerging doctrine; indeed, the Court said very
little about the standard governing brief street detentions other than
that their "limitations will have to be developed in the concrete factual
circumstances of individual cases." 158 But in later cases, the Court
recognized that such a stop might be found lawful on either of two
different bases: (1) an individualized suspicion basis, as reflected in the
Court's declaration in United States v. Cortez 159 that an "assessment
. . . based upon all the circumstances, . . . seen and weighed . . . as
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement ... , must
raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing"; 160 and (2) a standardized procedures basis, as
reflected in the assertion of a unanimous Court in Brown v. Texas 161
that a brief detention for investigation could "be carried out pursuant
to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of
individual officers." 162 This "plan" alternative is reminiscent of the
"standard procedures" and "administrative standards" approaches
previously discussed, and consequently I will examine it first.
Although the Court in Brown did not elaborate on its dictum, an
insight into what the Court apparently was alluding to is revealed by
the earlier decision in Delaware v. Prouse. 163 The Court there was concerned with a so-called "routine" stopping of a vehicle to check its
registration and the operator's driver's license, done without a reasonable suspicion the car was being operated in violation of law and not
"pursuant to any standards, guidelines, or procedures pertaining to
156. 392 U.S. at 14.
157. Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control ofPolice Discretion, 17 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 551, 594 (1984).
158. 392 U.S. at 29.
159. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
160. 449 U.S. at 418.
161. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
162. 443 U.S. at 51.
163. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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document spot checks ...." 164 Rejecting the State's argument that its
"interest in discretionary spot checks as a means of ensuring the safety
of its roadways outweighs the resulting intrusion on the privacy and
security of the persons detained," the Court held that individual stops
were permissible only upon individualized reasonable suspicion, that
is, if "there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered ...." 165
But of relevance here is the Court's final comment:
This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States
from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or
that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning
of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative.
We hold only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not
for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the
unbridled discretion of police officers. 166

This statement provoked a "sarcastic rejoinder" 167 from Justice
Rehnquist, the lone dissenter. He objected that the Court, in finding
that "motorists, apparently like sheep, are much less likely to be
'frightened' or 'annoyed' when stopped en masse," had "elevate[d] the
adage 'misery loves company' to a novel role in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence." 168 But the majority in Prouse is correct. For one
thing, under the Camara balancing-of-interests formula, there is a genuine difference in degree-of-intrusion terms between an individual stop
and a roadblock stop. As the Court recognized in another case upholding checkpoint operations conducted to discover illegal aliens:
"At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he
is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion." 169
For another, random stops without reasonable suspicion are different
as a constitutional matter precisely because they do not safeguard citizens against "indiscriminate official interference." 17° Finally, the distinction drawn by the Prouse majority makes sense in terms of
representative reinforcement, which "[i]n the context of the fourth
164. 440 U.S. at 650.
165. 440 U.S. at 655, 663.
166. 440 U.S. at 663. Two concurring Justices "assume[ed] that the Court's reservation also
includes other not purely random stops (such as every tenth car to pass a given point) that equate
with, but are less intrusive than, a 100% roadblock stop." 440 U.S. at 664 (Blackmun and
Powell, JJ., concurring).
167. Mertens, supra note 157, at 556.
168. 440 U.S. at 664.
169. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976) (quoting United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975)).
170. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975).
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amendment [means] that the tradeoff between privacy and law enforcement produced by our political institutions should stand, provided that everyone's interests are equally represented in the making
of these political decisions." 171 If it is thus true that the police can be
afforded greater leeway "when the privacy costs of law enforcement
are spread more widely, and there is a reduced risk that the politically
less powerful are being forced to bear disproportionate privacy
losses," 172 then we have
a plausible rationale for the Court's decision [in Prouse]. We should be
worried that the police on patrol will disproportionately stop the young,
the black, and the poor for suspicionless license checks. Those with
more political clout will be spared the indignity and inconvenience of
these checks. By requiring that the police use full roadblocks, the cost of
law enforcement is more widely distributed, and there is less reason to
fear that the governmental decisions to trade off privacy for law enforcement are being made without considering everyone's interests equally. 173

These reasons supporting the Prouse roadblock thesis also lend
support to the notion that police regulations concerning roadblocks
should be encouraged if not mandated by the courts. Law enforcement guidelines regarding when, where and how roadblocks are to be
conducted can serve to ensure that the roadblocks are as unthreatening as possible, that unnecessary discretion has not been left to officers
on the scene, and that a considered judgment was made by departmental policymakers about exactly how much of an intrusion upon the
public at large is feasible - including in a political sense - in the
interest of law enforcement. In. its truncated discussion of roadblocks
in Prouse, the Court unfortunately said nothing about whether law
enforcement guidelines were necessary or desirable in the conducting
of roadblocks. But the Court significantly distinguished the random
stop conduct in Prouse from that attending the alien-check roadblock
earlier approved by the Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. 114
That case does make some exceedingly important observations about
the significance of law enforcement policies relating to roadblock operations. Specifically, the Court in Martinez-Fuerte (1) stressed that,
with regard to the type of roadblocks upheld by the Court, the "location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by
officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources"; (2) emphasized that
"deference is to be given to the administrative decisions of higher
171.
172.
173.
174.

Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 116, at 93.

Id. at 95.
Id.
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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ranking officials"; and (3) cautioned that those decisions are nonetheless "subject to post-stop judicial review." 175 Moreover, lower courts
increasingly are taking positions that make it most advantageous for
the police to engage in careful rulemaking concerning driver's license/
auto registration checkpoints. Some of the decisions place great emphasis upon the existence of and compliance with discretion-limiting
directives from supervisory officials, intimating that such guidelines
are essential, 176 while others at least express a preference for a system
of "written policy and supervision."1 77
The Supreme Court addressed the roadblock issue more directly in
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 178 upholding the Department's
sobriety checkpoint program under which "checkpoints are selected
pursuant to . . . guidelines, and uniformed police officers stop every
approaching vehicle." 179 In rejecting the state court's conclusion that
the checkpoint program was unconstitutional under the Brown v.
Texas 180 balancing test because it failed the "effectiveness" part of that
test, the Court stated:
The actual language from Brown v. Texas, upon which the Michigan
courts based their evaluation of "effectiveness," describes the balancing
factor as "the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest."
This passage from Brown was not meant to transfer from politically ac175. 428 U.S. at 559, 566. The Court in Martinez-Fuerte proceeded to review the administrative decision to place an alien checkpoint at San Clemente and found that the "location meets the
criteria prescribed by the Border Patrol to assure effectiveness.'' 428 U.S. at 562 n.15.
176. E.g., State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980) (emphasizing that as a
result of Prouse the prosecutor urged each police department to adopt rules and procedures on
roadblocks; that the chief in this town did adopt them; that they limited discretion by, e.g.,
establishing a precise formula as to the pattern of stops - "every 5th car during light traffic
hours" - at roadblocks; and that the police at the scene did in fact follow these "specific, defined
standards in stopping motorists"); State v. Shankle, 58 Or. App. 134, 647 P.2d 959 (1982)
(stressing that the Oregon State Police Policy Manual included factors on how to locate the
checkpoint and how to conduct it, including what pattern of stops to utilize, so that "the procedures to be applied by the police officers were explicitly set out in their policy manual").
177. For example, State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143, 147 (Me. 1985), which, however, rejected
defendant's argument that the roadblock was unconstitutional because "there was no decision
made by policy making supervisory officers either as to the necessity for and reasonableness of
the road block, or to the procedures to be used in setting up the road block.'' 486 A.2d at 146.
Compare State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985), expressing "doubt
whether an internal directive of a law enforcement agency can overcome constitutional defects in
a statute.'' The statute in Marchand permitted random stops, while the State Patrol's written
procedures mandated stopping and inspection "in groups of vehicles without discrimination.''
But, this policy was not as carefully drafted as those approved in other cases and, as far as the
court could tell, "they may be overridden by local supervising officers, and •.• individual officers
may decide to implement them at any time or place without supervisory authority," and thus the
court ultimately concluded "that the State Patrol procedural policy offers exactly the kind of
unconstrained and unfettered discretion that Prouse condemns.'' 104 Wash. 2d at 440-41, 706
P.2d at 228.
178. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
179. 110 S. Ct. at 2487.
180. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
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countable officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal
with a serious public danger. Experts in police science might disagree
over which of several methods of apprehending drunken drivers is preferable as an ideal. But for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the
choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for,
limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers. 181

This passage from Sitz may be read as encouraging policymaking
at the police level, for it reflects a disinclination by the Court to second-guess certain kinds oflaw enforcement decisions. It also explains,
or at least intimates, what kinds of law enforcement policies are most
likely to receive such deference. For one thing, the Court indicates
that the challenged practice arose out of a 9ecision concerning how
best to utilize "limited public resources," a kind of police decision that
presumably ought to receive considerable respect. For another, the
Court emphasizes the propriety of leaving the decision to employ sobriety checkpoints with "politically accountable officials." That
squares with the previously discussed concept of representative reinforcement: the decision was, in effect, a decision to enforce the DWI
laws by placing a burden on the motoring public at large, and consequently it is the kind of law enforcement decision for which the political process presumably affords an effective check.
Viewed more broadly, however, Sitz is rather disappointing. It
does not reflect a commitment by the Court either to take full account
of relevant police guidelines or to submit those guidelines to meaningful judicial review. The necessity for doing either is virtually assumed
out of existence by the slight-of-hand manifested in the Sitz excerpt set
forth above. By asserting that the case involves nothing more than a
decision belonging entirely to the police to choose from among what
are conclusively characterized as "reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques," 182 the Court finds it unnecessary to assay or even
articulate all the considerations that entered into the law enforcement
judgment that checkpoints constitute a "reasonable alternative." That
judgment, if made within the framework of Brown v. Texas, would be
that the benefits of the contemplated practice outweigh its
intrusiveness.
But, just how intrusive a roadblock is depends, as noted earlier,
upon the safeguards attending its operation - those which minimize
the effect of the seizures upon motorists and those which eliminate the
181. 110 S. Ct. at 2487.
182. 110 S. Ct. at 2487.
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risk of arbitrary action by those operating the checkpoint, as reflected
in applicable police guidelines. 183 Were there guidelines in Sitz? Yes;
as the Court noted, an advisory committee "comprising representatives of the State Police force, local police forces, state prosecutors,
and the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute ...
created guidelines setting forth procedures governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity." 184 However, the Sitz majority
deemed it unnecessary to reveal in what manner those guidelines minimized the intrusiveness of the checkpoint operation, except to note the
extremely important requirement that "[a]ll vehicles passing through a
checkpoint would be stopped."18s
This disinterest in the existing guidelines in Sitz contrasts sharply
with many of the earlier lower court decisions regarding sobriety
checkpoints. In those decisions, courts generally accepted that these
roadblocks must be "established by [a] plan formulated or approved
by executive-level officers of the law enforcement agencies involved"
which contains "standards ... with regard to time, place" and similar
matters. 186 This, the courts explain, is necessary because "[i]n the absence of record evidence that the decision to establish the roadblock
was made by anyone other than the officers in the field, the roadblock
in question [has] certain characteristics of a roving patrol," 187 namely,
an appreciable risk of an arbitrary basis for the site or time decision.
Thus, a failure to have these decisions made by supervisory officials
has been a factor stressed by courts in holding a particular sobriety
checkpoint illegal, 188 while other cases upholding these roadblocks
183. Pre-Sitz cases in the lower courts properly concluded that such a roadblock is illegal if
the officers at the scene are operating "without specific directions or guidelines." State ex rel.
Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. l, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983); see also State v. Jones, 483 So.
2d 433, 438 (Fla. 1986) ("[l]t is essential that a written set of uniform guidelines be issued before
a roadblock can be utilized."); Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 111, 743 P.2d 692, 700 (1987)
(stressing "supervising officer relied on a manual setting forth procedures for the roadblocks").
This is because it is essential that the "officers in the field [have] no discretion to pick and choose
who would or would not be stopped." State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 542, 673 P.2d 1174, 11&5
(1983) (upholding the sobriety checkpoint at issue there because it did not involve such discretion); see also People v. Bartley, 109 III. 2d 273, 289-90, 486 N.E.2d 880, 887 (1985) (stressing
that vehicles were "stopped in a preestablished, systematic fashion" pursuant to existing "guidelines on the operation of the roadblock"); and compare Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389
Mass. 137, 144, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983) (checkpoint violated fourth amendment where "the
officers used their own discretion in deciding which cars to stop"); Webb v. State, 739 S.W.2d
802, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (checkpoint operation illegal, as "absolutely no evidence of
formal, neutral guidelines formulated by superior law enforcement officials").
184. 110 S. Ct. at 2484.
185. 110 S. Ct. at 2484.
186. State ex rel Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 9, 663 P.2d 992, 1000 (1983) (Feldman, J., concurring).
187. State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 394-95 (S.D. 1976).
188. E.g., State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, 277, 383 N.W.2d 461, 463 (1986) (fact that "there
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have placed considerable emphasis upon the fact that a high-level plan
determined where and when the roadblocks would be operated. 189
Lower courts have also focused upon the presence or absence of other
established procedures, such as those providing notice by advance
publicity 19° or at the checkpoint scene.191
As for the perceived benefits underlying the decision by Michigan
law enforcement authorities to utilize sobriety checkpoints, the opinion of the Sitz majority is again wanting. True, the Court says "empirical data" supports the checkpoints' efficiency and then points to trial
testimony "that experience in other States demonstrates that, on the
whole, sobriety checkpoints resulted in drunken driving arrests of
around 1 percent of all motorists stopped." 192 To this, the three dissenters cogently respond (i) that "there is absolutely no evidence that
this figure represents an increase over the number of arrests that
would have been made by using the same law enforcement resources in
conventional patrols"; 193 and (ii) that in any event the benefit articulated by law enforcement witnesses at trial was instead deterrence,
about which no evidence was offered. 194 Obviously, meaningful judicial review of law enforcement policies cannot occur in such
circumstances.
Whether Terry stops pursuant to a "plan" rather than on individualized suspicion are permissible in somewhat different situations is unclear. In Brown v. Texas, 195 where the Supreme Court asserted that
either individualized suspicion or "a plan embodying explicit, neutral
limitations on the conduct of individual officers" was required by the
fourth amendment, the invalidated stop was of a pedestrian whom two
was no plan formulated at the policymaking level of the Omaha Police Department" was fatal to
program's constitutionality); Commonwealth v. Amaral, 398 Mass. 98, 100, 495 N.E.2d 276, 278
(1986) (mere fact captain in state police set up the roadblock not a sufficient showing; need to
show he used "carefully established standards and neutral criteria" in determining "the time and
location of roadblocks").
189. E.g., People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 289, 486 N.E.2d 880, 887 (1985) (stressing that
"[t]he potential for arbitrary enforcement is reduced when the decisipn to establish a roadblock is
made and the site of the roadblock is selected by supervisory-level personnel," as here); Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, 293, 535 A.2d 1035, 1043 (1987) ("[T]he very decision to
hold a drunk-driver roadblock, as well as the decision as to its time and place, should be matters
reserved for prior administrative approval ....").
190. E.g., State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984); Commonwealth v.
Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337
S.E.2d 273 (1985).
191. E.g., State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986); State v. Leighton, 551 A.2d 116 (Me.
1988).
192. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2487-88 (1990).
193. 110 S. Ct. at 2495 (Stevens, Brennan and Marshall JJ., dissenting).
·
194. 110 S. Ct. at 2495-96 (Stevens, Brennan and Marshall JJ., dissenting).
195. 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
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policemen on· midday patrol saw walking away from another man in
an alley in an area with a high incidence of drug traffic. Because the
Court's "plan" thesis was set out in this context, it raises the question
whether stops without individualized reasonable suspicion but pursuant to a neutral plan would be lawful when undertaken for more generalized or more traditional enforcement purposes, where the usual
practice has been to focus upon particular suspects. That is, if in
Brown it had been established that the officers stopped the defendant
pursuant to a police department "plan" to question all pedestrians
found in the "high drug problem area," would the outcome have been
different? I doubt it. For one thing, the "high drug problem area" in
most municipalities would be an area populated by minorities, and
thus this police policy could not be supported by the previously discussed representation-reinforcement theory. Put differently, this
would not be an instance in which a uniform policy had substantially
reduced the "risk that the politically less powerful are being forced to
bear disproportionate privacy losses." 196 Moreover, this does not
seem to be the kind of policy that would in fact substantially eliminate
discretion by officers in the field, for the simple reason that stopping
all pedestrians would likely be well beyond police capabilities.
However, if the "plan" could somehow be more carefully and
tightly formulated, then there would be good reason to look with favor
upon this kind of law enforcement planning by police agencies. The
chances of drawing up a suitable plan appear greater if the plan addresses a somewhat special problem existing at a certain time and
place. The point is illustrated by State v. Hilleshiem, 197 where two
officers devised a plan to stop all vehicles entering a certain park after
dark because of a wave of vandalism, which had caused $8000 worth
of damage. Though the court cautioned that "[i]n the balancing equation, stopping motorists for the purposes advanced here might have
even less public benefit than a stop to check illegal immigration or
drivers' licenses," 198 suppression of the evidence obtained in a stop
pursuant to this scheme was ordered only because the plan had not
been developed at a policymaking level, where presumably this issue
would have received more careful attention. 199 Hilleshiem thus sug196. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 116, at 95.
197. 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980).
198. 291 N.W.2d at 319.
199. Compare People v. John BB., 56 N.Y.2d 482, 438 N.E.2d 864, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1010 (1982), upholding a burglary-investigation stop pursuant to a uniform plan developed and
implemented by an officer in the field. For criticism of John BB. and approval of Hil/eshiem, see
Kerr & Feldman, Roving Roadblocks and the Fourth Amendment, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 124
(1984).
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gests, as occasionally has been held, 200 that when police administrators
have been able to identify a rather unique law enforcement problem in
a discrete location such as a park, a carefully drafted "plan" responding to that problem might well authorize stops for questioning at that
location without individualized suspicion.
Turning now to the other variety of Terry stop, that made upon
individualized reasonable suspicion, it is necessary to ask once again
about the actual and potential contribution of police guidelines in articulating clear and proper standards of police conduct. At least as an
abstract matter, it seems that administrative regulations on this subject
would be helpful. If, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, the requisite degree of suspicion depends upon the evidence "as understood by
those versed in the field of law enforcement,"201 then surely this expertise can be brought to bear not only through the particular experiences
of individual officers in the field but also by the collective learning of
the agency as revealed in announced policies. In addition, law enforcement regulations on what constitutes reasonable suspicion might
give appellate courts "full appreciation" of the "overall impact and
implications" of specific investigative activities and might "govern the
exercise of discretion" by police, or so argued one judge with respect
to the common practice of DEA agents.stopping suspected drug couriers at airports. 202 But the experience of courts with the law enforcement guidelines that emerged in that precise area, the so-called "drug
courier profile," raises profound questions about what can be accomplished by rules governing this sort of police activity.
Profiles are
an increasingly popular law enforcement tool. Most prominent among
the profiles in use today are those used to identify hijackers and those
used to identify persons who smuggle illegal aliens into the country.
Less prominent are the drug smuggling vessel profile, the stolen car profile, the stolen truck profile, the alimentary-canal smuggler profile, the
battering parent profile, and the poacher profile. 203
200. E.g., People v. Meitz, 95 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 420 N.E.2d 1119 (1981). In Meitz, the court
upheld a stop where
the police officer was responding to a governmental interest in stopping a rash of auto thefts
occurring on a particularized parking lot. Prior to instituting the registration check procedure, the police department determined the times in which the thefts were likely to occur
and the automobiles that were to be the most susceptible. The department then instructed
its officers to stop all susceptible vehicles leaving the two exits of the parking lots during the
hours in which the thefts had originally occurred.
95 Ill. App. 3d at 1037, 420 N.E.2d at 1122.
201. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
202. United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1350, 1352 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting).
203. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: ''All Seems Infected That Th' Infected Spy, as All
Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd Eye," 65 N.C. L. REv. 417, 423-25 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
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But in terms of frequency of use by law enforcement officers and frequency of confrontation by appellate courts, none matches the drug
courier profile. "Between 1976 and 1986 over 140 reported cases involved airport stops by DEA agents based on the 'drug courier profile.' " 204 The content of the profile seems not to have always
remained constant, which is one of the criticisms of it,205 but as most
commonly confronted in the cases206 the profile consists of seven primary and four secondary characteristics:
r. The seven primary characteristics are: (1) arrival from or departure to

an identified source city; (2) carrying little or no luggage, or large quantities of empty suitcases; (3) unusual itinerary, such as rapid tum-around
time for a very lengthy airplane trip; (4) use of an alias; (5) carrying
unusually large amounts of currency in the many thousands of dollars,
usually on their person, in briefcases or bags; (6) purchasing airline tickets with a large amount of small denomination currency; and (7) unusual
nervousness beyond that ordinarily exhibited by passengers.
The secondary characteristics are: (1) the almost exclusive use of
public transportation, particularly taxicabs, in departing from the airport; (2) immediately making a telephone call after deplaning; (3) leaving
a false or fictitious call-back telephone number with the airline being
utilized; and (4) excessively frequent travel to source or <;Iistribution
cities.201

The Supreme Court's most recent208 lucubration regarding this
profile is United States v. Sokolow, 209 holding the police had grounds
to stop the defendant as a suspected drug courier on the particular
cluster of characteristics present in that case. 210 In marked contrast to
some of the Supreme Court cases previously discussed, Sokolow does
not express any deference toward the law enforcement guidelines 204. Id. at 417.
205. Smith, J., dissenting in Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 588, 300 S.E.2d 126, 137, cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983), objected that "profile characteristics appear to vary wildly from
airport to airport and case to case, giving the profile a shifting, chameleon·like quality."
206. Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843, 871-72 (1985).
207. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
910 (1980).
208. The Court's earlier encounters with the profile occurred in Florida v. Rodriguez, 469
U.S. 1 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980), which, it is said, have merely "created confusion among the lower courts." Becton,
supra note 203, at 454.
209. 109 s. Ct. 1581 (1989).
210. In Sokolow,
the agents knew, inter a/ia, that (1) he paid $2100 for two airplane tickets from a roll of $20
bills; (2) he traveled under a name that did not match the name under which his telephone
number was listed; (3) his original destination was Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; (4)
he stayed in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round-trip flight from Honolulu to
Miami takes 20 hours; (5) he appeared nervous during his trip; and (6) he checked none of
his luggage.
109 S. Ct. at 1583.
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that is, the drug courier profile - relied upon by the DEA agents.
Indeed, the Court framed the issue not as whether the profile somehow counted in the government's favor, but rather as whether the profile counted against the government. No, the majority responded: "A
court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must
require the agent to articulate the factors leading to that conclusion,
but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a 'profile' does not
somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a
trained agent." 211 But this was not good enough for the two dissenters, Marshall and Brennan. Though on other occasions (for example,
in Bertine) these two justices had decried the failure of administrative
regulations to confine police discretion sufficiently, this time their concern was that the profile tended to discourage individual exercise of
discretion! They objected:
It is highly significant that the DEA agents stopped Sokolow because he
matched one of the DEA's "profiles" of a paradigmatic drug courier.
[A] law enforcement officer's mechanistic application of a formula of
personal and behavioral traits in deciding whom to detain can only dull
· the officer's ability and determination to make sensitive and fact-specific
inferences "in light of his experience," particularly in ambiguous or borderline cases. Reflexive reliance on a profile of drug courier characteristics runs a far greater risk than does ordinary, case-by-case police work,
of subjecting innocent individuals to unwarranted police harassment and
detention. 212

Though at first blush such a judicial assessment of law enforcement policy might strike one as curious at best, on reflection the seeming incongruity vanishes. For one thing, the profile differs
substantially from the law enforcement guidelines discussed earlier.
The others occasionally involve factual determinations of a general nature (for example: Is this a sensible location to place an immigration
checkpoint? Is this a sensible place to put a sobriety checkpoint?), but
in the main call for what are essentially policy judgments (for example:
Do we prefer to impound all arrestees' cars, or should some simply be
left at the scene? With available resources, how often should we inspect auto dismantling shops?). The profile, on the other hand, is intended to establish which air travelers are probably drug couriers,
which is a specific factual determination, that is, one concerning the
sufficiency of suspicion regarding particular individuals. Before courts
readily accept that kind of law enforcement guideline, they are certainly obliged "to require that the government provide satisfactory
211. 109 S. Ct. at 1587.
212. 109 S. Ct. at 1588 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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empirical evidence that the profile is 'valid' and actually 'works.' " 213
No such showing bas been made, as Professor Cloud highlights in a
comparison of the drug courier profile and the hijacker profile:
Unlike the drug courier profile, the hijacker profile was designed systematically. The Task Force employed social science methodologies to
develop the profile. After studying known hijackers, the task force compiled twenty-five to thirty characteristics in which hijackers differed significantly from the air-traveling public. By putting only a few of them
together they arguably obtained a reliable combination sharply differentiating potential hijackers from non-hijackers.
Unlike the drug courier profile, the hijacker profile was tested systematically to measure its validity. These procedures included field tests
involving several hundred thousand air travelers as well as the historical
application of the profile to known hijackers.
The drug courier profile has never been subjected to any comparable
process of validation. The government has not conducted any systematic study to determine whether the drug profile has any predictive validity. Indeed, the only evidence of its effectiveness has generally been the
testimony of agents who utilize the profile in the field. This testimony is
typically deficient because even when agents "were recognized as having
made stops in a substantial number of past instances where their suspicions proved to be correct [there was no] evidence as to the number of
instances in which innocent passengers had been subjected by them to
investigatory stops.'•214
A second reason the drug courier profile has deservedly not received deference from the appellate courts is that the profile fails to
limit meaningfully the discretion of agents in the field (or, more precisely, in the airport). For one thing, as the lower court noted in Sokolow, the profile has a "chameleon-like way of adapting to any
particular set of observations. " 215 As another court put it, "there is no
such thing as a single drug courier profile; there are infinite drug courier profiles. The very notion is protean, not monolithic." 216 This is
why the profiles tell us that it is suspicious to get off an airplane first217
or last21 s or in between,2 19 and this is also why they are an object of
ridicule. 22 For another thing, the profiles do not predetermine just
what combination of suspicious factors must exist for a lawful stop, an

°

213. Cloud, supra note 206, at 873.
214. Id. at 874-75 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 48-49 (2d
Cir. 1981), ajfd., 462 U.S. 696 (1983)).
215. 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987), revd., 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
216. Grant v. State, 55 Md. App. 1, 6, 461 A.2d 524, 526 (1983).
217. United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1982).
218. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
219. See United States v. Buenanventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980).
220. See LaFave, A Fourth Amendment Fantasy: The Last (Heretofore Unpublished) Search
and Seizure Decision of the Burger Court, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 671.
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especially critical matter given that some of those factors (for example,
traveling from a source city) "describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers." 221 Given this latter problem, it appears
that the lower court's efforts in Sako/ow to distinguish "ongoing criminal activity factors" (at least one of which would be required in every
case) from "personal characteristics"222 were a meaningful response to
such amphibolic law enforcement guidelines, though the court's application of this distinction admittedly was not without difficulties. 223
V.

ARRESTS: POLICE LIMITS ON FORCE AND CUSTODY

Of the important decisions a police officer must make, none carries
potential consequences more serious than the determination whether
to employ force against a suspect to make an arrest. A mistaken failure to utilize force may result in escape of the suspected offender and,
in some instances, subsequent serious harm to others. A mistaken use
of force, especially ·a firearm, may result in serious injury to or even
the death of the suspect or bystanders. Moreover, "[p]olice use of firearms to apprehend suspects often strains community relations or even
results in serious disturbances." 224 No wonder, then, that this subject
is a matter of special concern to responsible police administrators225
and that, contrary to the situation at the time of the ABF Survey, 226
police guidelines on the use of force are now very common. 227 These
guidelines may quite properly impose limitations more stringent than
those the legislature has adopted. 228
The absence of an internal police shooting policy or . . . the existence of
internal shooting policy that merely restates the law, leaves officers only
221. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980).
222. United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1987), revd., 109 S. Ct.
1581 (1989).
223. The Sokolow majority questioned, for example, whether the lower court's illustrations of
"ongoing criminal activity" factors, traveling with an alias or taking an evasive path through the
airport, had "the sort of ironclad significance attributed to them by the Court of Appeals." 109
S. Ct. at 1586.
224. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 189.
225. See Edwards, The Shot in the Back Case: Tennessee v. Garner, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 733 (1986).
226. See W. LAFAVE, suna note l, at 209 ("Police manuals and instructional materials •..
tend to be ambiguous on the use of force in making arrests. Some police manuals make no
mention of the problem at all."). Similarly, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 189, comments that "a 1961 survey of Michigan police forces found that 27 out of 49 had no firearms
policies."
227. See Fyfe, Tennessee v. Garner: The Issue Not Addressed, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 721, 723 n.10 (1986).
228. Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 372, 132
Cal. Rptr. 348, 352 (1976); Chastain v. Civil Serv. Bd. of Orlando, 327 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976).
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their own subjective criteria for deciding whether to use deadly force.
Unfortunately, in these hurried and excited circumstances, an officer's
best judgments are often not equal to those that could be formulated at
leisure, and in advance, by top level policy makers with the time to consider more fully the merits and ramifications of various alternative
actions. 229

When the Supreme Court had occasion to decide under what circumstances police may constitutionally resort to deadly force in attempting to make an arrest, the Court made use of law enforcement
policies in an unusual way. The case was Tennessee v. Garner, 23° a
wrongful death action brought under the federal civil rights statute. A
Memphis police officer had shot and killed an unarmed youth fleeing
from the burglary of an unoccupied house. The officer's actions conformed to a state law following the common law rule, which (as the
Court noted) "allowed the use of whatever force was necessary to effect the arrest of a fl~ing felon ...." 231 The actions also conformed
to police department policy, which was slightly more restrictive but
still allowed use of deadly force in cases of burglary. It was not this
particular police regulation which grabbed the Court's attention, however, but rather the pattern revealed in the regulations of other departments across the country:
Overwhelmingly, these are more restrictive than the common-law
rule.... A 1974 study reported that the police department regulations in
a majority of the large cities of the United States allowed the firing of a
weapon only when a felon presented a threat of death or serious bodily
harm.... Overall, only 7.5% of departmental and municipal policies
explicitly permit the use of deadly force against any felon; 86.8% explicitly do not. 232

The Court concluded that this narrower position rather than the common law rule squared with the fourth amendment.
In reaching this result, which was urged upon the Supreme Court
by many police groups, 233 the Justices found the police guidelines
highly relevant in several respects. First, said the Court, "[i]n light of
the rules adopted by those who must actually administer them, the
older and fading common law view is a dubious indicium of the constitutionality of the Tennessee statute now before us/' 2 34 This reliance
229. Fyfe, supra note 227, at 722-23 (footnotes omitted).
230. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
231. 471 U.S. at 12.
232. 471 U.S. at 18-19 (citations omitted).
233. "The Police Foundation, together with nine national and international Associations of
Police and Criminal Justice Professionals, plus the Chiefs of Police Associations of two states and
thirty-one law enforcement chief executives, joined as amici curiae in support of Cleamtee Garner, the father of the deceased minor." Edwards, supra note 225, at 735.
234. 471 U.S. at 19 (footnote omitted).
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upon the police regulations and, in addition, modem statutes on the
subJect, apparently constituted "an open effort to divine a national
trend or consensus concerning the common law rule. " 235 This is not
to suggest that "the Court was doing nothing more than acting prudently to cover its political fiank.'' 236 Rather, as one perceptive commentator has noted,
[T]he Court's concern with current practice is both defensible and suggestive of a process that is quite sophisticated. For if the Court is engaged in the explication of values, it makes very good sense to refer to
and be guided by the value judgments of other societal decision makers.... Thus, ... interpretation need not flow from the top down, but
may come from the bottom up as well. Indeed, this vertical dialogue is
especially appropriate to a process of constitutional interpretation that
implicates society's values. 2 37

Second, the Court utilized the array of police regulations to rebut
arguments by Tennessee that the Court's restrictive standard was impracticable. Asserting that "[w]e would hesitate to declare a police
practice of long standing 'unreasonable' if doing so would severely
hamper effective law enforcement,"238 the Court concluded, in effect,
that widespread existence of the narrower rule in police guidelines
demonstrated the lack of such adverse effects. Specifically, the Court
noted there had been "no suggestion that crime has worsehed in any
way in jurisdictions that have adopted, by legislation or departmental
policy, rules similar to that announced today." 239 As for the contention that the Court's rule "requires the police to make impossible,
split-second evaluations of unknowable facts," the Court responded
that "this claim must be viewed with suspicion in light of the similar
self-imposed limitations of so many police departments." 240
Whether the unique use of police regulations found in Garner is
likely to be repeated in future cases is unclear, although I doubt it will
become a common occurrence. There are probably not that many
other policy areas in which a consensus will emerge from the police
regulations as clearly as in Garner. Further, this collective judgment
about what the police should or should not do is likely to carry the
weight it did in Garner only when, as there, it tends to demonstrate
that the police are operating more narrowly than existing law would
235. Winter, Tennessee v. Gamer and the Democratic Practice ofJudicial Review, 14 N.Y.U.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 679, 683 (1986).
236. Id. at 684.
237. Id. at 684-85.
238. 471 U.S. at 19.
239. 471 U.S. at 19.
240. 471 U.S. at 20.

REV.

486

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:442

permit. Nevertheless, Garner demonstrates to the police establishment
that if the "position" of the police on an important issue of constitutional policy is effectively presented to the Court, the Court will consider it.
While the existence and content of police regulations was very
much in the forefront in the Garner Court's analysis, quite the opposite was true in two of the Court's other arrest cases: United States v.
Robinson 241 and its companion, Gustafton v. Florida. 242 In Robinson,
a District of Columbia police officer arrested defendant for operating a
motor vehicle after revocation of his operator's permit, searched defendant incident to that arrest, and discovered heroin inside a cigarette
package in the left breast pocket of defendant's coat. In a footnote, the
Court observed that a general order of the D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department mandated custodial arrest for this type of traffic violation
and that established procedures in the department required a search of
those arrested; yet the Court then admonished that "[s]uch operating
procedures are not, of course, determinative of the constitutional issues presented by this case." 243 The defendant contended that the bases for search incident to arrest - to find evidence of the crime for
which the arrest was made, and to find any weapons the arrestee might
use to escape - did not exist in this case. The Court responded that it
disagreed with the "suggestion that there must be litigated in each case
the issue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful
arrest." 244 Thus, concluded the Robinson Court, in every "case of a
lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also
a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment." 245 In Gustafton, where
marijuana cigarettes were found on defendant's person following his
arrest for not having his operator's license with him while driving, the
defendant claimed his case was different from Robinson in several respects, including that there were no applicable police regulations requiring the officer to take the defendant into custody or to make a fullscale body search incident to arrest. The Court summarily dismissed
that argument with the observation that these differences were not
"determinative of the constitutional issue." 246
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

414 U.S. 218 (1973).
414 U.S. 260 (1973).
Robinson. 414 U.S. at 223 n.2.
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 265.
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There is good- reason to be concerned about the Robinson-Gustafson holding that every custodial arrest, even for a minor traffic violation, permits a full search of the arrestee's person. There is good
reason to be even more concerned with the Court's later holding in
New York v. Belton 247 that in every instance in which "a policeman
has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile,
he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." 248 In all such instances, as
the Robinson dissenters emphasized, "there is always the possibility
that a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search warrant,
will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search. " 249 Given that
"[v]ery few drivers can traverse any appreciable distance without violating some traffic regulation," 250 this is indeed a frightening possibility. It is apparent that virtually everyone who ventures out onto the
public streets and highways (including Supreme Court Justices251 )
may then, with little effort by the police, be placed in a position where
his or her person at?-d vehicle are subject to search.
Because of this, the proposition that the fourth amendment should
be construed to bar custodial arrests for minor violations is an appealing one. That issue was not considered in the Robinson-Gustafton decisions, although this possibility may underlie Justice Stewart's
somewhat cryptic comment in his Gustafton concurrence "that a persuasive claim might have been made in this case that the custodial
arrest of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."252 But as yet, as
Justice Stevens has more recently noted, "the Court has not directly
considered the question ...." 253 It is true that "a persuasive claim"
can be made that custodial arrest for lesser offenses is unconstitutional; the argument is grounded in two important fourth amendment
principles discussed earlier - those concerning preventing arbitrary
exercise of government power, and those that require balancing the
individual privacy interests and governmental interests regarding custodial arrest. 254 This suggests that if the Court ever does reach this
)

247. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
248. 453 U.S. at 460 (footnotes omitted).
249. 414 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
250. B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 65
(1969 ed.).
251. Rehnquist Is Given Ticket for Speeding, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1986, at 10, col. 1.
252. 414 U.S. at 266-67 (Stewart, J., concurring).
253. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 450 n.11 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. See Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMPLE L. REv. 221, 224 (1989).
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question, a Garner-style assessment would be in order, in which case
the extent to which police regulations across the country do require
use of the citation alternative would be most relevant. 2 55
Although the Court in Robinson and Gustafton had no occasion to
consider that broader question, it is unfortunate that the Court did not
resolve the narrower issue so dramatically posed by the respective
state of applicable police regulations in those two cases: whether the
control of police discretion in Robinson and the absence of control in
Gustafton was the dominant characteristic in the cases - one which
should have produced different results in the two decisions. Had the
Court reflected more carefully upon the proper relevance of law enforcement guidelines in such cases, it might have realized the ineluctable rationality of this syllogism: "Arbitrary searches and seizures are
'unreasonable' searches and seizures; ruleless searches and seizures
practiced at the varying and unguided discretion of thousands of individual peace officers are arbitrary searches and seizures; therefore,
ruleless searches and seizures are 'unreasonable' searches and
seizures."256 As Professor Amsterdam has put it so eloquently, "[i]f
the Court had distinguished the two cases on this ground, it would ...
have made by far the greatest contribution to the jurisprudence of the
fourth amendment since James Otis argued against the writs of assistance in 1761 and 'the child Independence was born.' " 2 5 7
Perhaps the Court's failure to take this step was grounded in the
assumption that the risk of arbitrariness in law enforcement may be
sufficiently overcome by allowing a particular defendant to prove that
an officer acted from an ulterior motive. But tangible evidence of subjective motivation is difficult for defendants to produce and difficult for
courts to assess, 258 which perhaps explains why Justice White was
once moved to observe that "sending state and federal courts on an
expedition into the minds of police officers would produce a grave and
fruitless misallocation of judicial resources." 259 And this may explain
why the Supreme Court ultimately held that fourth amendment issues
255. Just what the pattern is here is unclear. Doubt has sometimes been expressed as to
whether police regulations requiring use of citations in specified circumstances have been
promulgated. See Salken, supra note 254, at 252-53. But rulemaking on this subject has often
been urged upon the police. See, e.g., 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 10-2.J(b)
(2d ed. 1980); ALI MODEL CoDE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 120.2(4) (1975).
256. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 417.
257. Id. at 416 (footnote omitted).
258. As one appellate judge commented about Robinson, it is "next to impossible to determine that in making the arrest the police were motivated by the desire to search for evidence of a
crime not related to the arrest." State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169, 197, 527 P.2d 1202, 1215 (1974)
(O'Connell, C.J., dissenting).
259. Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
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should be judicially resolved by use of an objective standard. The decision is Scott v. United States, 260 a wiretapping case in which the defendants' "principal contention" was that the evidence must be
suppressed because the agents did not make a good faith effort to comply with the minimization requirement. The Court concluded that the
government's response, that "subjective intent alone ... does not make
otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional,"
embodies the proper approach for evaluating compliance with the minimization requirement. Although we have not examined this exact question at great length in any of our prior opinions, almost without
exception in evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the
Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions
in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him....
We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the
state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the
legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.... The Courts of Appeals which have considered the matter have
likewise generally followed these principles, first examining the challenged searches under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved. 261

Although it is not clear that the Court in Scott meant to "apply its
supposed objective test to the issue of pretextual fourth amendment
activity," 262 applying this test produces the following results: (1) If
the police arrest X for crime A, as they would have in any event, in the
anticipation or hope of thereby finding evidence of crime B on X's
person, the latter "underlying intent or motivation" does not make
their action illegal. 263 (2) If the police stop X's car for minor offense A,
and they "subjectively hoped to discover contraband during the stop"
so as to establish serious offense B, the stop is nonetheless lawful if "a
reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose."264 (3) If police obtain a search warrant to search X's
premises for evidence of crime A, which again they would have done
in any event, the search is not illegal merely because the police suspect
they might find evidence of crime B. 265 ( 4) If X's car is searched in the
hope or expectation of finding evidence of crime B, but that search was
260. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
261. 436 U.S. at 136-38.
262. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving, 66 U. DET. L. REV.
363, 367 (1989).
263. E.g., Home v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 512, 515-17, 339 S.E.2d 186, 188-89 (1986).
264. E.g., United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting United
States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986)).
265. E.g., State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d 866, 876 (N.D. 1985).
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an inventory which would have been made in any event, 266 or a search
for evidence of crime A which would have been made in any event, 267
again the evidence is admissible. The decisions reaching these conclusions (often by relying on Scott) are sound, for when the action would
have occurred in any event, there is no conduct which ought to have
been deterred and thus no reason to bring the exclusionary rule into
play for purposes of deterrence.
But some of the allegedly pretextual search and seizure cases are of
another kind. The driver of an automobile suspected of unlawful di;ug
activity is placed under custodial arrest for a traffic violation and then
searched, although the arrest was not "one which would have been
made by a traffic officer on routine patrol against any citizen driving in
the same manner." 268 A person suspected of drug activity is arrested
late at night inside the premises of another by state police holding city
arrest warrants for two minor traffic violations, hardly the usual practice in dealing with outstanding traffic warrants. 269 An arrestee's car
is impounded and then inventoried "contrary to the usual procedure
followed in traffic cases." 270 Situations such as these involve what the
Supreme Court has properly characterized as "serious misconduct by
law-enforcing officers,"271 but this does not mean that the Scott reasoning is inapplicable. These and similar fact situations involve "serious misconduct" in spite of rather than because of the "underlying
intent or motivation" of the police. That is, the proper basis of concern is not with why the officer deviated from the usual practice but
simply that he did deviate. It is the fact of the departure from the
accepted way of handling such cases which makes the officer's conduct
arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness which, in this context, constitutes
the fourth amendment violation.
As a result, the question of what police ordinarily do in a particular set of circumstances becomes critical in these so-called pretext
cases. Illustrative are the facts in United States v. Guzman, 272 where a
New Mexico state patrolman stopped a car because the driver did not
have his seat belt fastened; the stop led to other events which uncovered cocaine in the car. The court explained that under the rule stated
above:
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

E.g., State v. Rodewald, 376 N.W.2d 416, 422 (Minn. 1985).

State v. Oliver, 341 N.W.2d 744, 745-47 (Iowa 1983).
Diggs v. State, 345 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
Harding v. State, 301 So. 2d 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
State v. Volk, 291 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960).
864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988).
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If police officers in New Mexico are required to and/or do routinely
stop most cars they see in which the driver is not wearing his seat belt,
then this stop was not unconstitutionally pretextual at its inception, even
if Officer Keene subjectively hoped to discover contraband during the
stop. Conversely, if officers rarely stop seat belt law violators absent
some other reason to stop the car, the objective facts involved in this stop
suggest that the stop would not have been made but for a suspicion that
coulq not constitutionally justify the stop. 273

In Guzman no evidence in the record pointed one way or another, as
the district judge had erroneously decided in defendant's favor on a
subjective state-of-mind theory. This did not require remand because
the appellate court found another basis upon which to rule in defendant's favor. But if remand had been necessary, then the district court
would have had to make a factual determination of whether drivers
violating the seat belt law are, on the one hand, "rarely" stopped or,
on the other, "routinely" stopped. In such circumstances, as the reference in Guzman to when police are "required" to stop such offenders
suggests, it is exceedingly important that the litigants and the court
focus on the question of whether or not a police rule on the subject
exists. Admittedly a court might find a practice "routine" even absent
such a regulation, but when no applicable law enforcement policy exists there is reason to be uneasy about applying the Scott approach.
Lacking such documentation, testimony by individual officers regarding what they perceive as the "routine" in their department carries at
least some of the risk that made the intent-of-the-officer approach unpalatable to courts: a significant chance that the truth of the matter
will not be accurately established by the self-serving declarations of
the officer whose conduct has been challenged. This suggests that this
is an area of fourth amendment litigation within which the existence of
and reliance upon law enforcement regulations takes on special
importance.
Some courts have given Scott a quite different interpretation, with
the unfortunate result that pretext contentions are being dismissed
even when it is shown (perhaps by noncompliance with an existing
police regulation) that the established "routine" was not followed. 274
273. 864 F.2d at 1518 (citation omitted).
274. Typical of this approach are these three cases, all involving pretext arrest claims and all
relying heavily on Scott: United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1181, 1186-87 (5th Cir. 1987)
(police, suspecting defendant but lacking grounds to arrest him for robbery, learned of outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest because of his failure to appear in court to answer petty theft
charge; because the police "took no action that they were not legally authorized to take," defendant's pretext claim rejected notwithstanding the facts; as stressed by. the dissenters, that this
warrant was "seven and a half years old, issued for failure to appear in city court to answer to a
charge that itself could no longer be prosecuted because the statute of limitations had run," and
that the "police never had a practice of following up on such warrants, and in foraging through
old records in search of a warrant against Causey they were not following any established pol-
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These decisions interpret the Scott "objective assessment" test as, in
effect, eliminating any meaningful way of mounting a pretext claim,
for they treat as irrelevant both what evidence may exist regarding the
actual intentions of the police and what evidence may exist that the
officers did not act as they ordinarily do. These courts thus treat police regulations as having no fourth amendment significance. 275 Yet,
noncompliance with a police regulation is powerful evidence that the
fourth amendment has been violated, for when a defendant has raised
a pretext claim the proper question is not whether the officer could
have acted as he did but rather whether the officer would have so acted
absent an invalid purpose. 276 Only by putting the proposition this way
is it possible to uncover and respond to arbitrary police conduct
which, as we have already seen, is one central concern of the fourth
amendment.
VI.

REMEDIES: THE LIMITS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The remedy for fourth amendment violations that courts most frequently invoke is the exclusionary rule. As declared in Mapp v.
Ohio, 277 this rule is "that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible."278 In practice, however, the exclusionary rule is somewhat narrower than this quotation would suggest. Because in recent
years the Supreme Court has stressed that the exclusionary rule's "major thrust is a deterrent one,"279 the Court generally has set the boundaries of the exclusionary rule by considering just when exclusion
icy"); United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 991 (5th Cir. 1987) (lawfully stopped burglary suspect asked to prove he carried adequate liability insurance for the car; when he could not do so
he was arrested, incident to which evidence of the burglary discovered; pretext contention dismissed with the observation "that the deputies had probable cause to and could lawfully arrest
Basey for violation of the Texas financial responsibility statute"); State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210,
229, 245, 463 A.2d 320, 330, 339 (1983) (detective ran routine check on defendant, suspected of
burglary at which distinctive footprint left, and learned of an outstanding contempt of court
arrest warrant for failure to appear in municipal court in response to a summons for a minor
offense, apparently a traffic violation; while executing warrant at defendant's home, boots with
distinctive pattern similar to the footprint seen and seized; because by statute the officer had "the
power to serve a contempt warrant," court concludes it irrelevant that, as the dissent put it, the
detective "conceded that he did not ordinarily serve contempt warrants and that it would have
been routine practice to call the defendant and tell him to come to police headquarters"), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984).
275. As the court put it in Bruzzese, "there is no need to determine whether [the officer's]
conduct constituted a 'deviation,' " for allegedly pretextual conduct is not to be "deemed unreasonable merely because a police officer deviates from his department's standard operating procedure." 94 N.J. at 228, 463 A.2d at 329-30.
276. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986).
277. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
278. 367 U.S. at 655.
279. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l, 12 (1968).
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would significantly further the deterrence objective. Under this approach, as Professor Amsterdam once put it, the rule is perceived as
"a needed, but grudgingly taken, medicament; no more should be
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease." 280
Police regulations sometimes have a bearing on whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate sanction: for example, a regulation may
be used to show that illegally seized evidence should be admitted because of its "inevitable discovery" by lawful means. 281 In the following discussion, however, my concern is with the possible relevance of
the police regulatory process to fourth amendment remedies in an
even more direct fashion. Two separate issues are considered. One
focuses on a more controversial limitation upon the exclusionary
rule, 282 the so-called "good faith" doctrine; the question is whether or
not police reliance upon a departmental rule or policy should be
deemed to constitute a form of "good faith" action that makes the
suppression remedy unnecessary. The second issue relates to a possible need to supplement the exclusionary rule because it is admittedly
an imperfect fourth amendment remedy, one which comes into play
only when illegal police activity has uncovered evidence of criminal
280. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378,
389 (1964).
281. The "inevitable discovery" doctrine is a subset of the broader proposition that it is inappropriate to exclude evidence that cannot fairly be characterized as a "fruit" of the antecedent
fourth amendment violation. As the Supreme Court explained in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S .. 431,
447 (1984), "if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably
and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is
no rational basis to keep that evidence from the jury in order to ensure the fairness of the trial
proceedings." But, to ensure that this exception to the fruits doctrine is applied only when those
circumstances exist, the Court cautioned in Williams, the prosecution must "establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means." 467 U.S. at 444. Just as with the previously discussed pretext doctrine,
the critical word here is "would"; it is again not good enough that the police could have lawfully
uncovered the evidence on some alternative basis.
This means, of course, that in many circumstances the courts are well advised to inquire
whether or not a relevant police policy existed. The presence or absence of such policy may
determine the critical fact question whether or not certain other events inevitably would have
occurred. E.g., State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 434, 512 A.2d 160, 172 (1986) (although defendant had been lawfully arrested, search of his car which uncovered drugs was unlawful because
not on probable cause and because delayed and thus not incident to arrest; remand for determination of whether drugs would inevitably have been discovered in inventory, which necessitates
consideration of "whether such a search would have been conducted according to standard ~tate
police operating procedures").
282. Compare, e.g., Ingber, Defending the Citadel: The Dangerous Attack of "Reasonable
Good Faith," 36 VAND. L. REV. 1511 (1983); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect
World: On Drawing ''Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. PITI. L. REv. 307 (1982); Mertens
& Wasserstrom, supra note 31; all opposing the "good faith" exception with, e.g., Ball, Good
Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The ''Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978); Carrington, Good Faith Mistakes and the Exclusionary
Rule, 1 CRIM. J. ETHICS, Surnrner/Fall 1982, at 35; Jensen & Hart, The Good Faith Restatement
of the Exclusionary Rule, 13 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 916 (1982).
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activity by one who both (i) has standing to object to that unconstitutional conduct, and (ii) is a person the authorities are interested in
prosecuting. Specifically, this second issue concerns whether courtmandated police rulemaking is in some circumstances a necessary or
appropriate additional means for protecting fourth amendment rights.
Justice White, dissenting in Stone v. Powell, 283 expressed the view
that the exclusionary rule
should be substantially modified so as to prevent its application in those
many circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer
acting in the good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing
law and having reasonable grounds for this belief. These are recurring
situations; and recurringly evidence is excluded without any realistic expectation that its exclusion will contribute in the slightest to the purposes of the rule, even though the trial will be seriously affected or the
indictment dismissed.284
The Supreme Court has not adopted such an across-the-board "goodfaith" exception, but has recognized two circumstances in which the
exception does apply. These are the reliance-on-magistrate situation
in United States v. Leon 285 and the reliance-on-statute situation in Illinois v. Krull. 2 86
In Leon, the district court suppressed drugs found in execution of a
facially valid search warrant because the affidavit for the warrant did
not establish probable cause. The court of appeals affirmed, but the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable
reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. " 287
The Court grounded this conclusion in a balancing-of-interests analysis, which considered the "substantial social costs" of the exclusionary
rule on the one hand and, on the other, the benefits of the rule in terms
of deterrence, which in the Leon circumstances were deemed "marginal or nonexistent." 288 The Court concluded that judges did not need
deterrence and, in any event, would not be deterred by exclusion, 289
283. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
284. 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting).
285. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
286. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
287. 468 U.S. at 900.
288. 468 U.S. at 907, 922.
289. The Court stressed that "there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates
are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment," and then added that, in any event, it
did not appear "that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant
deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate." 468 U.S. at 916.
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and further, that deterrence of the police simply was not involved in
this setting because "there is no police illegality and thus nothing to
deter. " 290
In Krull, concerning search of an auto junkyard pursuant to an
administrative inspection statute later found unconstitutional, the
Court held that "a good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule applies when an officer's reliance on the constitutionality of a statute is objectively reasonable, but the statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional."291 In abandoning its own clearly
established pre-Leon rule that police conduct undertaken pursuant to
an unconstitutional legislative conferral of search or seizure authority
is unlawful and thus a basis for suppression under the Mapp exclusionary rule, 292 the Court concluded that the "approach used in Leon is
equally applicable to the present case." 293 The Court looked for and
found factors equivalent to those which were determinative in Leon.
Specifically, the Court in Krull first reasoned that legislators were not
in need of deterrence and would not be deterred by exclusion.294 The
Court then declared: "The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively reasonable
reliance on a statute would have as little deterrent effect on the officer's actions as would the exclusion of evidence when an officer acts
in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant." 2 9 5
Does it follow that a "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule should also be recognized in those cases in which the officer who
conducted the seizure or search (now determined to be illegal) reasonably relied upon some police rule or policy? From the standpoint of
deterring the officer who made the search or seizure, one can argue
that suppression where the officer relied upon a police regulation
makes no more sense than where the officer relied upon a statute or a
warrant. Moreover, it can be contended that such an extension of the
"good-faith" exception would have the added advantage, even more so
than the possible judicial uses of police regulations discussed earlier, of
290. 468 U.S. at 921;
291. 480 U.S. at 346.
292. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
293. 480 U.S. at 349.
294. The Court declared that "legislators, like judicial officers, are not the focus of the rule,"
for like judges they are not inclined to act contrary to the fourth amendment, and added that
there was "nothing to indicate that applying the exclusionary rule to evidence seized pursuant to
the statute prior to the declaration of its invalidity will act as a significant, additional deterrent"
on legislators enacting such statutes. 480 U.S. at 350-52.
295. 480 U.S. at 349.
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providing police departments with strong encouragement to engage in
careful self-study to produce clear and comprehensive rules governing
day-to-day police practices.296 This would in fact advance the cause of
deterrence: "Police will be most effectively deterred from unconstitutional conduct if police departments respond institutionally to search
and seizure decisions by continually promulgating field regulations reflective of developing fourth amendment law, and by training officers
to follow such regulations." 297 In addition, so the argument proceeds,
this also would focus the exclusionary rule on instances in which there
were institutional failures to protect fourth amendment rights, for (assuming the individual officer complied with the existing policy) the
costs of evidence suppression would quite properly not be imposed
where "the police department in question has taken seriously its responsibility to adhere to the fourth amendment." 298 So focused, the
exclusionary rule would have a much more solid grounding, for it
would "be based upon an institutional, or systemic, view of
deterrence. " 299
Although these are rather compelling arguments, it is nonetheless
doubtful - at least to one not enamored with the "good faith" exception the Supreme Court has given us so far - whether such use of
police regulations in fourth amendment adjudication is desirable. 300
The Supreme Court in Leon and Krull asserted that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule has no application to judges and legislators,
unlike police; these distinctions were critical to the Court's analysis
and to the result reached in these two cases. But it cannot as plausibly
be asserted that the exclusionary rule is not directed to those upperlevel police officials who are responsible for formulating law enforcement policies touching upon fourth amendment rights. It may be true
that police administrators, as compared to officers on the beat, are not
directly "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime" 301 and thus are less tempted to cut corners. Yet there is no
apparent empirical basis for concluding that law enforcement personnel at the policymaking level are so intensely committed to fourth
296. Comment, Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 130 U. PA. L.

R.Ev. 1610, 1618-19 (1982) ("The heretofore absent incentive for the promulgation of such regulations can be provided by permitting, under a good faith exception, the use of evidence seized
pursuant to such regulations.").
297. Id. at 1618.
298. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1027, 1050 (1974).
299. Comment, supra note 296, at 1619. For a useful discussion of why that view of deterrence is a more sensible one, see id. at 1627-31.
300. See LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": United States v. Leon, Its Rationale
and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. R.Ev. 895.
301. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
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amendment values that they can always be trusted to draft regulations
that sufficiently respect those values. As a result, one can hardly be
sanguine about the prospects of such draftsmanship if those officials
knew - which would be the message of a "good-faith" exception operating in this area - that even if a regulation does not satisfy the
requirements of the amendment, it will nonetheless provide "a grace
period during which the police may freely perform unreasonable
searches. " 302
I am not suggesting here that some judgment must be made about
the malevolence level of police administrators as compared to, on the
one hand, judges and legislators and, on the other, beat patrolmen.
The fourth amendment is not concerned merely with calculated and
deliberate noncompliance with the amendment's proscriptions, and
thus the exclusionary rule is also applicable to the more common
fourth amendment violations resulting from carelessness. As the
Supreme Court recognized in Stone v. Powell, 303 what the exclusionary
rule demonstrates is "that our society attaches serious consequences to
violation of constitutional rights," which encourages those making
critical search and seizure decisions "to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system."304 In other words, the exclusionary rule serves not only to deter the occasional ill-spirited officer, but,
more importantly to influence police behavior more generally by creating an "incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior."3os
As I discussed earlier, there are many other ways, without such an
extension of the "good-faith" exception, in which police regulations in
fact are and potentially might be brought to bear in a meaningful way
upon the adjudication of fourth amendment issues .. Thus, it is especially important that those officers responsible for preparing and
promulgating these regulations do "incorporate Fourth Amendment
ideals into their value system" and, when in doubt, "err on the side of
constitutional behavior." The importance of such a frame of reference
is further highlighted by the much greater potential an ill-drafted regulation carries for harm than the single mistake by an officer in the
field, which ordinarily affects but one person. In this and other ways,
"Fourth Amendment violations become more, not less, reprehensible
when they are the product of Government policy rather than an indi302. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 366 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
This grace period might well be substantial, for if the very existence of the police regulation
presents a barrier to application of the exclusionary rule, a defendant would have no incentive to
bring that regulation into question.
303. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
304. 428 U.S. at 492.
305. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982).
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vidual policeman's errors of judgment."306 That explains why "any
rule intended to prevent Fourth Amendment violations must operate
not only upon individual law enforcement officers but also upon those
who set policy for them." 307 On balance, grounding a "good-faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule in reliance upon police regulations
is undesirable. 3 os
Another possible remedy for fourth amendment violations, especially those of a recurring nature, is an injunction. Although traditional principles of equity law limit somewhat the circumstances in
which this remedy is available, 309 courts no longer will decline to enjoin continuing fourth amendment violations by unquestioned acceptance of the hoary maxim that equity will not interfere with criminal
law enforcement. 310 There are, however, certain practical considerations that courts sometimes consider in determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief. For example, courts have declined to issue
injunctions against police violations on the grounds (i) that it was impossible to formulate an injunction clearly expressing what was prohibited and what was permitted, 311 and (ii) that it was not feasible to
involve the court in the day-to-day operations of the police department. 312 These concerns are certainly legitimate.
The problem of drafting a clear injunction is particularly acute in
the fourth amendment area, for it is especially difficult to define with
306. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 558 n.18 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
307. 422 U.S. at 558 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
308. This conclusion does not call into question those decisions holding that when a police
officer is a defendant in a§ 1983 action, he may assert his good faith as a defense, Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547 (1967), and that such good faith can be established by the officer's reliance upon
information conveyed to him by his department concerning the extent of his fourth amendment
authority, see, e.g., Dominguez v. Beame, 603 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1979); Thompson v. Anderson,
447 F. Supp. 584 (D. Md. 1977). The considerations in that context are very different, See
LaFave, supra note 282, at 343-47.
309. The plaintiff must lack an adequate remedy at law, see, e.g., Gomez v. Layton, 394 F.2d
764, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (stressing that courts "are not always required to await criminal trials
which may never materialize in order to vindicate crucial constitutional rights"), and must show
there is an imminent threat of harm, see, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111
(1983) (plaintiff, who alleged he was subjected to a chokehold after he stopped for traffic viola·
tion, could not have such conduct enjoined "[a]bsent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be
wronged in a similar way").
310. See, e.g., Harmon v. Commissioner of Police, 274 Mass. 56, 174 N.E. 198 (1931) (court
refused to interfere with police who had already searched defendant's club 70 times without
finding any illegal activity).
311. Wilson v. Webster, 315 F. Supp. 1104 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
312. Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968). As one appellate tribunal elabo·
rated, courts "should avoid unnecessarily dampening the vigor of a police department by becom·
ing too deeply involved in the department's daily operations, both because of the vital public
interests at stake, and because of the danger that the court could become enmeshed in endless
time-consuming bickering and controversy." Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343, 1351 (3d Cir.
1971).
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precision such concepts as probable cause and unreasonableness. If an
injunction were to do no more, in effect, than command the officers in
a department not to search unreasonably, a particular officer "will
either disregard the injunction when he realizes that it fails to give him
any indication of how to act in the given situation ... , or he will react
too cautiously and refuse to do anything at all for fear of being held in
contempt." 313 But there is a solution to this problem: the court might
simply "direct appropriate orders to the responsible officials, with a
view to having the situation corrected by them intemally,"314 a process "by which the police can be required to identify, articulate, and
defend, as well as be afforded an opportunity to change, their official
policies and practices." 315 In short, the court could mandate rulemaking regarding particular fourth amendment activities for which existing police rules are either inadequate or nonexistent.
This approach is advantageous for several reasons. As Professor
Herman Goldstein has noted:
When used in this manner the process contains a number of the elements
so seriously lacking in some of the most commonly proposed systems for
controlling police conduct. It operates on the top police administrator,
thereby applying pressure to the entire agency rather than to individual
police officers. It focuses upon administratively tolerated and continuing
patterns of police violations, rather than isolated incidents of wrongdoing. It is more concerned with preventing such violations in the future
than in providing redress for the past. And it has the potential for contributing, in a very significant way, to stimulating police agencies to better control their personnel through the structuring of discretion by
requiring that the agency itself produce explicit guidelines for police
functioning in important areas. By depending on the agency to formulate the policy, the court may produce a much more workable operating
code tailored to local needs than the court could ever prepare on its
own.316
This technique is illustrated by the actions of the federal district
court in Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability
and Responsibility v. Rizzo. 317 The court found that the violation of
constitutional rights by a small percentage of Philadelphia police
could not be dismissed as rare, isolated instances, and that, while such
acts did not result from a "conscious" departmental policy of violating
constitutional rights, it was departmental policy to discourage the fil313. Comment, Injunctive Relieffor Violations of Constitutional Rights by the Police, 45 U.
CoLO. L. REV. 91, 99 (1973).
314. Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343, 1351 (3d Cir. 1971).
315. Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
316. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 179.
317. 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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ing of citizen complaints, to resist disclosure of final disposition of
complaints, and "to avoid or minimize the consequences of proven
police misconduct." 318 The court directed the defendants - the
mayor, city managing director, and police commissioner - to prepare
"a comprehensive program" for dealing with the problem, which was
to include: (1) revision of police manuals to address such matters as
"unnecessary damage to property and other unreasonable conduct in
executing search warrants" and "limitations on pursuit of persons
charged only with summary offenses"; (2) "revision of procedures for
processing complaints against police"; and (3) prompt notification to
concerned parties of the action taken in response to such
complaints. 319
In Rizzo v. Goode, 320 the Supreme Court reversed. After first concluding there was no "threshold statutory liability" upon which equitable relief could be granted, 321 the Court next expressed concern that
the district judge's injunctive order, "significantly revising the internal
procedures of the Philadelphia police department, was indisputably a
sharp limitation on the department's 'latitud~ in the "dispatch of its
own internal affairs."' " 322 Relying upon the rule that in federal equity cases "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy" and also upon "important considerations of federalism," 323 the
Court concluded:
Contrary to the District Court's fiat pronouncement that a federal
court's legal power to "supervise the functioning of the police department ... is firmly established," it is the foregoing cases and principles
that must govern consideration of the type of injunctive relief granted
here. When it injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs of this state agency, the District Court departed from
these precepts. 324

This characterization of the district court's action is both unfortunate and inaccurate. In fact, as the three Rizzo dissenters noted, the
district court's "remedy is carefully delineated, worked out within the
administrative structure rather than superimposed by edict upon it,
318. 357 F. Supp. at 1318.
319. 357 F. Supp. at 1321.
320. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
321. 423 U.S. at 377. The Court concluded "that none of the petitioners had deprived the
respondent classes of any rights secured under the Constitution," and that "petitioners' failure to
act in the face of a statistical pattern" of fourth amendment violations from a small percentage of
the police department was not the equivalent of the affirmative action required under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. 423 U.S. at 377, 376 (emphasis in original).
322. 423 U.S. at 379.
323. 423 U.S. at 378.
324. 423 U.S. at 380 (ellipses in original).
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and essentially, and concededly, 'livable.' " 325 It carried with it the
special benefits described earlier; In particular, it left the police oommissioner "free to frame orders to patrolmen and alter enforcement
procedures to achieve the desired result with a minimum adverse effect
on the morale and efficiency of his police department, u326 while minimizing "the danger that federal injunctive remedies might inhibit constitutional as well as unconstitutional law enforcement practices.'' 327
Rizzo, then, represents yet another instance in which the Supreme
Court failed to take full advantage of the police policymaking device
as a meaningful technique for the protection of fourth amendment
rights. Particularly regrettable is that Rizzo apparently bars federal
courts in injunction proceedings from granting the type of relief that
would often best accommodate the interests of the plaintiffs, the police
department, and the enjoining court. Though admittedly the scope of
the Rizzo holding is not entirely clear, 328 it appears to proscribe the
mandated-rulemaking form of relief even when not accompanied by
the more controversial features of the Rizzo district judge's order.
That is, if a district court "stopped short of reorganizing the department's disciplinary apparatus and simply required the Police Commissioner to develop rules to govern the conduct of the individual police
malefactors," it seems that "the Rizzo holdings on Section 1983 liability and equitable restraint combine to render this limited remedy unavailable.''329 The most disturbing aspect of Rizzo, consequently, "is
that, in its haste to reject the relief granted, the Court has erected a
barrier to far less intrusive remedies."3Jo

VII.

CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS

"American police have always been expected to exercise discretion
in the performance of their duties.'' 331 Discretion involves "the making of decisions and implies that a decisionmaker can make choices
325. 423 U.S. at 387 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
326. Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78
YALE L.J. 143, 149 (1968) (footnote omitted).
327. Id. at 153.
328. See Note, Rizzo v. Goode: Federal Remedies for Police Misconduct, 62 VA. L. REv.
1259, 1272 (1976), commenting on the uncertainty regarding "whether high police officials could
be proper defendants when the magnitude of the abuses is different in kind or degree, but either
no demonstrable policy exists or plaintiffs can only establish one that has evolved de facto at
lower levels in the police department hierarchy."
329. Id. at 1279-80.
330. Id. at 1283.
331. Williams, Police Rulemaking Revisited: Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem, 41
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984, at 123, 181.
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among alternative courses of action," 332 which is the essence of police
work; it "is fraught with decision," and "patrol officers exercise choice
constantly." 333 It is those circumstances- complexity plus discretion
-which prompted the recommendation in the ABF Criminal Justice
Survey (often echoed since by commentators and in reports and law
reform proposals, and sometimes acted upon by the police) that police
agencies draft written policies for the guidance of their officers. Discretion is inevitable, but in a democratic society the discretion allowed
public officials should not be "unconfined and vagrant"; it needs to be
"canalized within banks that keep it from overftowing."334
I have assumed, as have many others, that rulemaking is desirable
even with regard to the fourth amendment activities of the police, despite the fact that the exclusionary rule assures considerable attention
to such police conduct by the courts. The existence of a substantial
body of case law on the subject of search and seizure is no reason to
forgo rulemaking, for there is ample room for creative administrative
regulation within the interstices of extant fourth amendment doctrine. 335 What Amsterdam calls "the more :flexible and professional
technique of rulemaking" 336 is especially promising as a means for (1)
affording greater protection against arbitrary searches and seizures, a
major fourth amendment concern, (2) assuring a more meaningful
contribution of police expertise, and (3) controlling those kinds of
fourth amendment activities that almost never reach the courts and
thus are untouched by the operation of the exclusionary rule.
It is fair to ask at this point whether or not, in the new regime of
police rulemaking, these benefits have been fully realized. The answer
quite clearly is no. With respect to the fourth amendment activities of
the police, there has been (presumably) a fair amount of police
rulemaking and (unquestionably) a substantial amount of court review
of police searches and seizures. Yet the necessary synergism is lacking; it is not ordinarily the case that law enforcement guidelines constitute the centerpiece of this judicial analysis, and therefore it presently
cannot be said that rulemaking has contributed favorably to our
332. Reiss, Consequences of Compliance and Deterrence Models of Law Enforcement for the
Exercise of Police Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984, at 83, 89.
333. Bayley & Bittner, Leaming the Skills of Policing, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Au·
tumn 1984, at 35, 36.
334. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
335. See Caplan, supra note 31, at 504 ("even in an area of the law that appears to be satu·
rated by judicial decisions there is much uncharted terrain for the agency to map"); McGowan,
supra note 35, at 677 ("even under the shadow of constitutional commands, there is room for
experimentation in law enforcement methods; and the administrative agency model is a demonstrably effective means of pursuing such a pragmatic course").
336. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 417.
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fourth amendment jurisprudence, improving in the process the quality
of police search and seizure practices. There are three significant reasons for this:
(1) Insufficient judicial encouragement ofrulemaking. "To the extent that the judiciary seeks out police policy as an aid in its own decisionmaking, instead of focusing only on the conduct of the officers
involved in a particular case, it can inspire more rulemaking by the
police." 337 Such judicial stimulation of rulemaking is present to a degree in the Supreme Court's opinions; there are several fourth amendment doctrines which by their nature encourage the adoption of police
policies and regulations. Illustrative are the Bertine "standardized
procedures" rule; the Camara "reasonable . . . administrative standards" requirement; the Brown "plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations" concept; and even the Scott "objective assessment" test, which
lower courts have often interpreted as requiring inquiry, upon a pretext challenge, into whether the police deviated from their usual practice. Garner deserves special mention, for it shows that when the law
enforcement community takes pains to educate the Court about what
is mandated by police regulations across the country, the Court will
take notice~
Closer inspection of some of these and other developments, however, supports the conclusion that the Supreme Court has fallen short
of doing all that it might have done. The inventory cases, for example,
are sufficiently imprecise to lend themselves to the interpretation that
departmental rules on impoundment and inventory are not really necessary. Thus, in Opperman the Court asserts a "standard police procedures" requirement but never refers to or quotes any regulations in the
Vermillion Police Department. Indeed, the Court finally refers to the
quoted term as if it simply means what police departments generally
often do, leaving it to concurring Justice Powell to invoke the protection-against-arbitrariness concern and to note that this concern was
met by the Vermillion department's requirement of complete inventory of all impounded vehicles. As for the inspection cases, the sad
fact is that the Court has created a hypertrophic exception to the warrant requirement and then made the worst of a bad situation by assuming that when no warrant is needed administrative regulations are
likewise unnecessary. Perhaps even more noteworthy is the Court's
improvident failure on other occasions to make police rulemaking the
focal point of a decision. This has occurred both within the context of
337. Caplan, supra note 31, at

50~.
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the exclusionary rule, as with the Robinson-Gustafson tandem, and
without, as with Sitz and Rizzo.
(2) Nonexistent or inadequate judicial evaluation of rules. A second
important function of courts with respect to police regulations is to
pass judgment on the reasonableness of the regulations; even under a
rulemaking regime, courts "continue to be, as before, the ultimate
shield of the citizen from the improper actions of his govemment."338
Here as well, the actions of the Supreme Court are less than encouraging, for the Court has kept as much distance from existing police rules
as possible. In such cases as Opperman, Robinson, and Gustafson the
Court discusses extant rules only in footnotes, and then typically only
to disclaim their relevance. Similarly, in Sitz the Court largely ignored
the guidelines that had been promulgated regarding sobriety checkpoints. Bertine is unique; it is the only case in which the defendant
specifically challenged a particular departmental regulation, but the
Court summarily dismissed the contention by misreading the regulation as containing "standardized criteria guiding an officer's decision
to impound a vehicle."339
The Sitz case is especially disappointing, for the majority seems not
to have grasped the fact that the existence of police guidelines does not
call for total abdication by the Court of its fourth amendment responsibilities. The police guidelines in Sitz, which authorized resort to
DWI checkpoints pursuant to procedures mostly unspecified by the
Court, were upheld pursuant to the startling proposition that "the
choice among such reasonable alternatives" was entirely for "politically accountable officials" to make. 340 In one stroke, the Court managed to avoid any meaningful review of whether the Michigan
guidelines (a) sufficiently minimized the intrusion upon those stopped
at checkpoints or (b) were sufficiently grounded in a showing of the
relative predicted effectiveness of checkpoints. If, as the Court earlier
stated in Robinson, "such operating procedures are not ... determinative of the constitutional issues," 341 then Sitz falls well short of even
the more limited judicial review appropriate within a regime of police
rulemaking.
Exactly what posture should a reviewing court take with respect to
a police regulation? Surely there is some middle ground between the
Sitz approach and that of an earlier era when applicable law enforcement guidelines were treated as if they were totally irrelevant. With338.
339.
340.
341.

McGowan, supra note 35, at 686.
479 U.S. at 376 n.7.
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1990).
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.2 (1973).
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out suggesting that the analogy is apt in all respects, it seems that
established administrative law doctrine respecting judicial review of
administrative action is useful in this setting as well. Under this doctrine, courts give some deference to professional judgment. As the
Supreme Court put it in Youngberg v. Romeo, 342 "courts must show
deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional," that
is, "a person competent whether by education, training or experience,
to make a particular decision at issue." 343 If, as in Romeo, the professional judgment of adnµrustrators in a state hospital regarding appropriate treatment programs is entitled to deference, then surely
deference to professional judgment is likewise appropriate regarding
police officials who (as put in an unobjectionable part of Sitz) "have a
unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers."344
I am not suggesting, however, that invocation of "professional
judgment" commands automatic judicial approval of and deference to
any and all administrative decisions. Especially when constitutional
limitations are at issue, as they most certainly are when the police regulations govern fourth amendment activities, the review function of
the courts must be performed with sufficient intensity to ensure accountability and fairness in the rulemaking process. The rulemaking
agency must be required to satisfy the court that the decisionmaking
leading to the rule at issue was both informed and rational.
Such was the conclusion in the leading administrative law case of
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 345 where insurance companies petitioned for review of an order of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration that rescinded a preexisting safety rule requiring that
newly manufactured automobiles be equipped with air bags or seat
belts. The Supreme Court, in the course of agreeing with the court of
appeals that NHTSA had failed to show sufficient justification for this
action, first decided that a rule modification or rescission was subject
to the same intensity of review as standards initially promulgated via
informal rulemaking. The Court then proceeded to elaborate what
such review entailed: the burden is on the agency to "cogently explain
why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner," and this expla342. 457 U.S. 307, 323 n.30 (1982).
343. 457 U.S. at 323 n.30. For other illustrations of this principle, see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-09 (1986); Irving lndep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891-92
(1984); and Board of Educ., Hendrick Hudson Cent. School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 20708 (1982).
344. 110 S. Ct. at 2487.
345. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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nation must be sufficient to enable the court to conclude that the rule
"was the product of reasoned decisionmaking." 346 A greater showing
is needed "than the minimum rationality a statute must bear in order
to withstand analysis under the Due Process Clause," and consequently "the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.' " 347 What this means,
the Court in State Farm added, is that an agency rule cannot survive
judicial review
if the agency has relied on factors which [it is not allowed] to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise. 3 48

If such "hard look" review349 is appropriate for the NHTSA decision
on passive restraints in vehicles, then surely no lesser judicial scrutiny
should suffice regarding the decision of the Michigan Department of
State Police to use DWI checkpoints to combat drunken driving.
(3) Failure of litigants to focus on rules and their rationale. The
preceding discussion emphasized that the Supreme Court has on several occasions failed to take advantage of existing opportunities either
to stimulate police rulemaking or to subject such rulemaking to meaningful review. But that is not the entire story. Yet another reason
exists why the perceived benefits of police rulemaking regarding their
fourth amendment activities have not yet been fully realized: very
often the appellate courts (including the Supreme Court) are not provided with the information needed to put the specific conduct at issue
into the appropriate context. "The fact material which the appellate
judicial tribunal has official liberty to consider in making its decision is
346. 463 U.S. at 48, 52.
347. 463 U.S. at 43 & n.9 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
156, 158 (1962)).
348. 463 U.S. at 43.
349. This phrase comes from the opinion of Judge Leventhal in Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which he stated that judicial intervention is
necessary "if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger signals, that the
agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged
in reasoned decision-making." 444 F.2d at 851 (footnote omitted).
,
As explained in G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
182, 197 {3d ed. 1986):
Although Judge Leventhal says that it is the agency that must take a hard look at the issues
before it, the phrase is also used more loosely to i9dicate that the court in a case like ••.
State Farm takes a hard look at the agency's decision! .•. Although State Farm does not
invoke hard look review by name, the Court's decision is generally regarded as having ratified it.
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largely walled in." 350 It consists of the record made below and such
data as may be incorporated in a brief, which in most search and
seizure cases collectively include neither the relevant police regulations nor supporting information that would permit a State Farm-style
hard-look review of the applicable law enforcement policy.
Such lack of information may have a profound effect upon the way
in which the fourth amendment issue before the court is perceived and
resolved, as can be illustrated by comparing one of the decisions from
my earlier exegesis with a more typical limited-record case. The former is the Garner decision, which is an especially attractive example of
reliance upon rulemaking to enhance fourth amendment jurisprudence. In that case, because of the information provided in the record
and briefs, it was possible for the Supreme Court to place an important
decision of an individual officer (to use deadly force) into the context
of his department's official policy regarding such conduct, and then to
place the rule of that department into the context of law enforcement
expertise more generally, as reflected in the relevant rules of a great
many other police departments. Because so many departments had
authorized the use of deadly force in circumstances significantly narrower than allowed at common law, the Court was able to conclude
that there was no police necessity supporting continued adherence to
the common law position.
In stark contrast to Garner is New York v. Belton, 351 where a New
York trooper stopped a. vehicle for a traffic violation and then, because
he believed the occupants were in possession of marijuana, arrested the
four occupants and subsequently searched the passenger compartment
of that vehicle. At issue was the lawfulness of the vehicle search,
which the Supreme Court resolved by announcing the broad rule that
in any case in which "a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest
of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. "352 Why such a broad rule? Because, the Court explained, the
police were entitled to a "straightforward rule," 353 which by implication the Court indicated was unachievable by any narrower direction
to the police expressed in terms of the arrestee's actual access to the
vehicle notwithstanding his arrest.
At precisely this point, the issue in Belton seems remarkably similar to that in Garner, for an oft-stated justification for the common law
350.
351.
352.
353.

K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 28.
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
453 U.S. at 460 (footnotes omitted).
453 U.S. at 459.
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any-felony rule regarding deadly force is that the police are entitled to
a clearly stated and easy-to-apply rule - an argument before the
Court in Garner and urged by the dissenters in that case. That purported justification failed in Garner because the Court learned the police had concluded as a rulemaking matter that narrower limits upon
use of deadly force were feasible and could be expressed in departmental regulations. This strongly suggests that before the "straightforward rule" argument should carry the day in Belton, it would again be
instructive to know what extant police regulations had to say on this
matter. Did the trooper's conduct in Belton conform to the New York
State Police guidelines on when a vehicle may be searched incident to
arrest? If not (or, even if so), does that rule identify and articulate in
reasonably clear fashion specific circumstances short of the all-cases
holding in Belton in which an incident-to-arrest vehicle search is permitted? If so (or, even more important, if not), do the rules of other
law enforcement agencies on this same subject indicate that police
have been able to articulate and live with a less expansive vehicle
search rule? Despite the relevance of these Garner-style queries, the
Supreme Court was in no position to pursue them in Belton, for the
record and briefs did not include the information essential to their
resolution.
The other point here is that even if a police regulation is put
squarely before the Supreme Court (for example, because the defendant is specifically challenging it, as in Bertine); chances are the record
will lack the supporting information necessary for a hard-look judicial
review. In Bertine, the defendant contended "that the inventory
search of his van was unconstitutional because departmental regulations gave the police officers discretion to choose between impounding
his van and parking and locking it in a public parking place." 354 At
that juncture, it would have helped to know precisely why the Boulder
Police Department had formulated the impoundment regulations as
they had, and specifically why the Department had concluded that the
regulations need not provide any guidance on when the impoundment
alternative was permissible. But there is nothing on these points in the
record, which merely contains some comments by the inventorying
officer on his understanding of the purposes underlying the Department's inventory procedures.
Although these three shortcomings make a more particularized
critique of rulemaking in fourth amendment adjudication difficult, a
354. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987).
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few additional observations are in order. Five problem areas deserve
attention:
(i) The relevance of rules. The Supreme Court's general disinclination to mandate or assess police rules raises anew the fundamental
question of precisely what significance a pertinent law enforcement
regulation should have when a court sets out to determine fourth
amendment issues in an exclusionary rule context. 3 55 In part, this
concerns how compliance or noncompliance with the regulation bears
on the issue of suppression. One possible position is that exclusion is
unnecessary when the police officer reasonably relied upon a rule of his
agency. But as discussed earlier, this proposition is unsound. It is
grounded in an unduly narrow conception of the exclusionary rule's
deterrence function, and would undesirably skew the pressures which
ought to operate upon police administrators drafting and promulgating regulations.
Another position is reflected by United States v. Caceres, 356 holding that the failure of an IRS agent to follow IRS electronic surveillance regulations did not require suppression. The Court reasoned
that it could not "ignore the possibility that a rigid application of an
exclusionary rule to every regulatory violation could have a serious
deterrent impact on the formulation of additional standards to govern
prosecutorial and police procedures," and concluded that
[i]n the long run, it is far better to have rules like those contained in the

IRS Manual, and to tolerate occasional erroneous administration of the
kind displayed by this record, than either to have no rules except those
mandated by statute, or to have them framed in a mere precatory
form.357

This reasoning is rather compelling, and seems particularly applicable
in the present context, where the police via rulemaking have imposed
limits on their own authority beyond those courts could be expected to
inflict as a matter of fourth amendment doctrine. 35 s
It is clear, however, that this laissez faire approach is not appropriate for all forms of fourth amendment activity, because sometimes the
existence of and compliance with administrative regulations is - or
ought to be - the very warp and woof of the controlling doctrine. If,
355. Of course, also of great importance is the question of what significance a rule violation
should have in other contexts, such as a civil suit or disciplinary action. See H. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 31, at 122-24.
356. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
357. 440 U.S. at 755-56.
358. For example, as noted in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 17, concerning the
New York City Police Department's stop-and-frisk guidelines: "Emphasis was not placed upon
defining the law so much as it was upon urging the police to exercise restraint and to act well
within the outer limits of their prescribed authority."
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as seems to be the case, the Bertine "standardized procedures" doctrine is intended both to ensure against arbitrary searches and seizures
and to permit departments the opportunity to determine in the first
instance how the legitimate objectives of the inventory process can
best be served, then surely both the existence of reasonable regulations
and compliance with those regulations are prerequisites to a finding of
constitutional conduct. Similarly, if the inspection cases mean that
when the authorities want to be able to conduct inspections absent
individualized suspicion they must act pursuant to "reasonable standards" adopted by legislation or administrative regulation, once again
the existence of and conformance to those limits are essential to a finding of "reasonableness" under the fourth amendment. The same may
be said of the stop-and-frisk power, where police lacking individualized reasonable suspicion must act pursuant to "a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations." In a sense, even the Scott doctrine is of this
character, for it will not do for the police to contend that upon a pretext challenge the courts may inquire into neither their subjective intentions nor whether the conduct deviated from usual practice.
A harder question is whether noncompliance with regulations
should be determinative in other fourth amendment circumstances.
Consider, for example, execution of a search warrant at premises
known to be unoccupied, an action the courts have quite consistently
upheld. 359 A police department might for good reason adopt a regulation limiting the circumstances in which warrant execution in the absence of an occupant is permissible. 360 If such a regulation is violated
in a particular case, should this require suppression of the evidence
obtained in execution of the warrant? The logic of Caceres suggests
not. This would ensure that rulemaking is not discouraged and yet
would not require that courts maintain a disinterest in compliance
with existing police regulations. That is, even if the failure to comply
with a police regulation governing when unoccupied premises may be
359. The cases, collected in 2 w. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT§ 4.7(c) (2d ed. 1987), find support in the assertion in Dalia v. United
States, 441U.S.238, 257 (1979), that "it is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers
to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by
warrant ...•"
360. Thus, MODEL RULES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, Search Warrant Execution, rule 207
(Mar. 1974), says that
[e]ntry into a vacant search site is permissible only if one of the following circumstances is
present:
(i) There is reason to believe the occupants will not be returning to the premises for an
extended time period, if at all; or
(ii) The investigation is likely to be frustrated or hampered if the premises are not imme·
diately searched; or
(iii) Returning to serve the warrant at another time will cause substantial inconvenience
to the search team, and will improperly waste manpower.
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entered does not per se mandate suppression, compliance with the regulation on another occasion certainly deserves consideration in deciding that the warrant execution process was carried out in a reasonable
fashion. 361
Though all this suggests that the Caceres approach is best, there is
another possible alternative which, however, lies somewhat beyond
current fourth amendment law. "There remains," as Judge McGowan
wrote, "the interesting, albeit presently unresolvable, question of
whether the judicial power could be exerted to compel the police to
proceed by rule-making." 362 Under this approach, as its principal advocate Amsterdam explains,
(1) Unless a search or seizure is conducted pursuant to and in conformity with either legislation or police departmental rules and regulations, it
is an unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the fourth amendment. (2) The legislation or police-made rules must be reasonably particular in setting forth the nature of the searches and seizures and the
circumstances under which they should be made. 363

Certainly this alternative deserves further consideration. It would extend the advantages of police rulemaking across the entire breadth of
fourth amendment activity, and of course would nullify the rationale
of Caceres, as suppression for nonconformance with rules would not
deter rulemaking if the rulemaking was itself constitutionally
compelled.
(ii) The context ofjudicial evaluation. In an exclusionary rule context, as illustrated by Opperman, Bertine, Robinson, and Gustafson, the
Supreme Court has failed to focus on the applicable police regulations
as intensely as it might have. As previously note<;l, the fault may not
be entirely that of the Court, for there is no tradition in such cases for
the litigants to put the issues in a manner that would naturally direct
attention to the entire range of activity covered by a specific police
regulation. "Lawyers striving for victory in adversary litigation cannot be expected invariably to put 'the individual case in the context of
the overall enforcement policy involved.' " 364
361. Another illustration of the central point may be derived from United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696 (1983), holding that luggage may be briefly seized on reasonable suspicion but then
concluding the particular seizure at issue was not of reasonable dimensions. The Court expressed
concern with the failure of police to "make it absolutely clear how they plan to reunite the
suspect and his possessions at some future time and place." 462 U.S. at 708 n.8. The Court did
not mandate rulemaking on this subject, nor did it intimate that violation of some rule on luggage seizure would itself necessitate suppression. It seems likely, however, that if in Place there
had been a well thought out rule dealing with notification which the agents had complied with,
the case would have looked much different to the Court.
362. McGowan, supra note 35, at 684.
363. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 416.
364. McGowan, supra note 35, at 678.
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Although one would hope that this will change over time as police
rulemaking becomes more commonplace, past experience suggests
that perhaps the judicial review function would be better performed in
another context. Because "judicial review is most effective if it relates
to carefully developed administrative policies rather than to the sporadic actions of individual police officers," 365 it may well be, as some
have proposed,366 that a more direct judicial review prompted by an
injunction or declaratory judgment action is preferable. Sitz, however,
illustrates that meaningful review is not a certainty even in this context. Although the Court emphasized that it was the sobriety checkpoint program on its face, rather than some particular seizure under
the program, which was at issue, the Court nonetheless failed to scrutinize all the program's relevant guidelines. Another possibility would
be some form of judicial review after promulgation but before implementation of the rules, a course which "has increasingly become a
characteristic of general administrative law" and which, it has been
suggested, "would appear to have significant advantages in respect of
police rule-making." 367
Even if procedural barriers stand in the way of other interested
parties obtaining such review, 368 there are many instances in which the
police themselves could (and might be well advised to) obtain preimplementation review. The vehicle for doing so, of course, is application for a search warrant. Precisely this kind of review has been
mandated in some circumstances (for example, under Camara) but not
others. But, while the courts have not required that warrants be obtained in advance for such activities as establishing a roadblock at a
certain place and time, 369 police administrators would be well advised
to obtain a warrant. Because these operations can be planned well in
advance, there is no reason for not obtaining the prior approval of a
magistrate. Such approval would minimize the chance of after-thefact challenge of the decisions regarding when, where and how the
roadblock should be operated.
Less apparent is the utility of a police-initiated judicial review of
365. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 18-19.
366. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 429; Quinn, supra note 31, at 35-36.
367. McGowan, supra note 35, at 686.
368. McGowan, supra note 35, at 688 comments:
What is not perhaps so clear is the question of judicial power to grant such review at the
instance of a party who has not yet become the object of the rules he seeks to attack. The
issues are the familiar ones of standing and ripeness, with the latter being of predominant
concern.
369. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (no warrant needed for
illegal alien checkpoint); State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984) (no warrant
required for DWI checkpoint).
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some broader policy which does not fit comfortably within the traditional warrant process. For example, if a law enforcement agency
were to develop some sort of "profile" for deciding when to stop persons suspected of a particular type of criminal activity, should the
agency have available a mechanism to obtain an advance judicial
· "stamp of approval" upon the profile? Especially if the procedure
were to be ex parte, as with a warrant application, it is at least debatable whether the review would likely be sufficiently intense or comprehensive to reveal the full range of fourth amendment concerns
threatened by implementation of the policy.
(iii) Custom versus policy. Another troubling characteristic of
some of the Supreme Court's cases discussed earlier is that they suggest a willingness to accept a vague and undocumented representation
of the established practices of a particular police agency. In Opperman
and Lafayette, for example, the only mention of the practices in Vermillion and Kankakee regarding vehicle inventories and effects inventories, respectively, is that the inventorying officer testified he acted
pursuant to "standard procedure" in his department. In neither case
is any police regulation ever quoted or even cited, and thus (as we have
seen) there is lower court authority that the Bertine-mandated "standardized procedure" need not be memorialized in a written departmental communication. This is unsettling for two reasons: (i) there is
always the risk that such testimony will be self-serving and thus fail to
represent accurately what the usual practice is; and (ii) even if it is the
usual practice, it does not follow that it is the considered policy of the
department.
Reviewing courts must be more particular about separating mere
custom from policy. As the President's Commission cautioned, the
trouble with so-called standard procedures or policies which do not
appear in a police manual or written set of standard operating procedures is that they "have normally developed through customary practices that rarely are the product of careful analysis and are usually not
well understood by patrolmen."370 Existing custom may on occasion
tum out to provide a basis for official policy, but it is not the business
of a court to transmogrify the former into the latter: What is necessary is that there occur at the police level a "re-examination of established methods," a "conscious decision as to whether familiar ways of
doing things" are actually best. 371 Only if that process has occurred is
there really policy entitled to deference from reviewing courts under
370. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 189.
371. McGowan, supra note 35, at 681.
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the previously-discussed Romeo principle, for only then can the courts
see clearly
what it was that the police were doing in a particular case, and why they
thought it necessary to do whatever they were doing, and what are the
limitations and extensions in police logic of the claim of necessity that is
advanced, and whether the claim of necessity advanced by the state's
lawyers before the court is in fact the claim of necessity upon which the
police acted or will ever act again, and whether the police believe in that
claim seriously enough to express it in a general operating procedure. 372

(iv) Hunch versus expertise. A central feature of our legal system,
in the elegant words of Karl Llewellyn, is that it
entrusts its case-law-making to a body who are specialists only in being
unspecialized, in being the official depositaries of as much general and
balanced but rather uninformed horse sense as can be mustered. Such a
body has as its function to be instructed, case by case, by the experts in
any specialty, and then, by combination of its very nonexpertness in the
particular with its general and widely buttressed expert roundedness in
many smatterings, to reach a judgment which adds balance not only, as
has been argued so often and so hard, against the passing flurries of public passion, but no less against the often deep but too often jug-handled
contributions of many technicians. 373

With respect to the actions of police agencies and their officers, then,
courts are not the experts but rather the intended recipients of expertise from the police. One supposed benefit of a rulemaking regime is
that it requires the ordering and communication of this knowledge and
permits "the application of expertise on a continuous and systematic
basis. " 374
But, just as it is imperative to distinguish custom from policy,
there is an equally compelling need to distinguish mere hunch from
expertise, for it is the law enforcement policy grounded in the latter
rather than the former which, under hard-look judicial review, is entitled to judicial deference. (As suggested earlier, the unwillingness of
courts to embrace the so-called "drug courier profile" seems largely
attributable to the fact that courts were not provided solid data supporting its predictive validity.) One difficulty in this area is the longstanding uncertainty about which police attitudes and practices truly
reflect expertise. There "has been little effort made to capitalize upon
police experience or to attempt to assess its reliability: to distinguish
accurate inferences from inaccurate ones; or to systematize experience
so that it can be effectively communicated . . . to others, like judges,
372. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 419 (footnotes omitted).
373. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 263.
374. McGowan, supra note 35, at 678 (emphasis in original).
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when the propriety of police action is challenged."375 Police agencies
need "to undertake in-depth inquiries in support of policies and rules
they decide to promulgate. It will not suffice, in establishing a policy,
simply to assert an often-repeated but untested claim as to its
value." 376 Moreover, because an unadorned policy statement is unlikely to be an adequate conduit of its underlying rationale or empirical basis, it is essential that police and prosecutors work together more
effectively to ensure that this supporting data also reaches the reviewing courts. When this occurs, the challenged police action is much
more likely to receive a favorable judicial reaction. 3 77
(v) How much rule, and how much discretion? "There is good discretion and bad discretion." 378 To this apothegm might be added
Llewellyn's precept that "to be right discretion, ... the action so far as
it affects any man or group adversely must be undertaken with a feeling, explicit or implicit, of willingness, of readiness, to do the like
again, if, as, and when a like case may arise." 379 If a major purpose of
police rulemaking is to place realistic limits upon police discretion,
then one mark of a reasonable regulation is that it serves to eliminate
bad discretion by requiring that like cases actually be treated alike.
But for the police administrator drafting the rule and the court reviewing it, there is the nagging question of precisely how broadly or narrowly this category of "like cases" ought to be defined. To take an
issue considered earlier regarding Bertine, which is better: a rule that
all arrestees' cars should be impounded (with perhaps one limited exception for a vehicle parked at the arrestee's premises), or a rule that
an arrestee's car should be impounded only if neither parking at the
scene nor turning the car over to another is feasible (then listing the
myriad of factors which bear upon the feasibility of each of those alternatives)? What is lurking here, of course, is the old "bright lines"
issue, which before now has been debated mainly with respect to the
375. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 20.
376. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 118.
377. See, e.g., State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (Law Div. 1980) (police
decision as to where to locate DWI checkpoint upheld where court advised it placed on a road
"where many bars are located" and where empirical data revealed that "seven fatal vehicular
accidents," in most of which "alcohol abuse by the driver of a vehicle was a contributing factor,"
had occurred in the past two years); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273
(1985) (DWI roadblock upheld; court stresses plan developed after extensive research into locations within city where there had been driving while intoxicated arrests and alcohol-related accidents), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986).
378. Pepinsky, Better Living Through Police Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984, at 249, 253.
379. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 217.
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rules of police conduct promulgated by appellate courts. 380 Is it better
that the police have the easily understood command, or is it better that
they make fewer intrusions under a regulation which by virtue of its
complexity will sometimes be misapplied and may sometimes serve to
shield deliberate arbitrariness?
Commentators on both sides of the rulemaking fence have warned
that decisionmaking in law enforcement is often complex and thus
ought not be compassed by overly simple rules. Professor Uviller, apparently swimming against the rulemaking tide, has expressed his concern this way:
The solace of standardized rules and procedures is largely illusory.
Rigid rules tend to ossify individual responsibility and discourage µtdividualistic thinking. Those who would shrink discretion obey the precept: "Treat likes alike." However, the overriding lesson of experience
in our criminal justice operation is that every case is different. The major worry is that the people out there dealing with the problems will lose
their appreciation of the differences between the cases and will begin reacting to them as repetitive.381

Similarly, Goldstein, though an advocate of police rulemaking, cautions that "it is impossible to prescribe with any precision what should
be done, since an infinite number of possible circumstances could occur." Thus for him intelligent rulemaking consists of alerting "officers
to the alternatives available for dealing with a given situation, to the
factors that should be considered in choosing from among available
alternatives, and to the relative weight that should attach to each factor."382 Doubtless both Uviller and Goldstein would take a dim view
of an impound-all-cars rule.
We need to understand, however, that at the police level pressures
will quite naturally push in the direction of the simplest possible rule,
thus favoring, for example, the impound-all-cars alternative. This is
best illustrated by a rulemaking development outside the fourth
amendment area. In Stovall v. Denno 383 the Court held that the defendant's one-on-one identification in lieu of a lineup was, under the
circumstances, "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law."
Lower courts, stressing the Court's use in Stovall of the "unnecessarily" qualifier and its reference in another case to a police need
380. Compare Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. P1rr. L. REV.
227 (1984) with LaFave, supra note 282.
381. Uviller, The Unworthy Victim: Police Discretion in the Credibility Call 41 LAW & CON·
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984 at 15, 32.
382. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 111-12.
383. 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
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"swiftly tc:> determine whether they were on the right track," 384 have
held that a one-on-one identification soon after the crime is permissible
when a prompt lineup is not feasible. 385 The rulemaking response of
the District of Columbia police department was not a regulation spelling out the factors bearing upon that unfeasibility; rather, what
emerged was the so-called "sixty minute rule," 386 the operation of
which was described thusly by top department officials:
Ifa suspect w[as] arrested within one hour of the time of the commission
of the offense, in an area reasonably proximate to the scene of the offense, he had to be returned to the scene for purposes of identification; if
arrested after one hour, he could not be so returned. 387

One leading advocate of police rulemaking asserted that this was precisely the kind of rule the police needed; in "a large metropolitan police department of 5100 men that investigates 800-1000 robberies a
month," the officers must have "a simple, easily-applied rule." 388 This
is also the justification which was offered for the rule by the department. "The result," the department spokesmen asserted, "is a rule
more readily understood by those who must use it and therefore more
vigorously enforced by those who must enforce it." 389 Perhaps even
more compelling proof of the strong police preference for the keep-itsimple approach is that in another large urban department lacking
such a straightforward guideline, the officers in the field nonetheless
managed to convince themselves that a rule of this kind existed!3 90
Much can be said for the Goldstein-Uviller thesis and also for the
contrary approach deliberately adopted in the D.C. department.
What this manifests is that the art/science of police rulemaking is bedeviled by a collision of those antithetical dynamics which pervade our
entire legal system; here again, we are confronted with the "conflict
384. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385 (1968).
385. E.g., United States v. Kessler, 692 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1982); State v. Hudson, 508
S.W.2d 707 (Mo. App. 1974).
386. Caplan, supra note 31, at 507.
387. Wilson & Alprin, Controlling Police Conduct: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 36
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1971, at 488, 496.
388. Caplan, supra note 31, at 507-08.
389. Wilson & Alprin, supra note 387, at 497.
390. H. UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 107-09 (1988) (New York City). The situation here
alluded to is helpfully summarized in Book Note, 87 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1311, 1312-13 (1989) (footnote and citation omitted):
Uviller describes the precinct's almost comically persistent belief in the "two hour/two-mile
rule." Uviller had protested at the officers' use of a "show-up" (a one-on-one exposure of
suspect to victim for identification) instead of a regular line-up. The officers assured Uviller
that because the show-up took place within two hours and two miles of the crime, its use
was permissible, notwithstanding its suggestiveness and the feasibility of a traditional lineup. When pressed to find the source of the rule, officers could only point to a dated departmental memo which stated that under unusual circumstances when a line-up is impracticable, one-on-one identification could be used instead.
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between the simplicity of rules and the complexity of human experience."391 So it is that the "major challenge, in each art::a of police
operations, is in deciding on the appropriate level of specificity for a
given set of guidelines."392
Although this means there is no ready solution to the previouslystated query of how much rule and how much discretion is called for,
a few observations are in order regarding the bright lines phenomenon
in this setting: (1) If there are to be some bright lines in police rules,
they should not inevitably be drawn as the Supreme Court has been
inclined to draw them - by opting for that form of "brightness"
which is most intrusive upon the interests of privacy and liberty,393
There is some hope here, as experience has shown that a police regulation might well "not seek to use the full authority granted by the case
law," as when it "surrenders certain powers that are not seen as
needed or helpful, even though granted by the courts. "394 (2) With
respect to certain forms of police activity, a bright line may be the only
constitutional choice. For example, Bertine makes that so with respect
to the inventory of containers within vehicles. The Court left police
departments with only two choices: a rule mandating inventory of the
contents of virtually all such containers, 395 or a rule barring inventory
of any of them. Doubtless this reflects a judgment that any less precise
(even if more logical) intermediate rule provides too great an opportunity for "slippage" - inconsistent action prompted either by misunderstanding or ulterior motives. The Court's holding may also
manifest another instance of the previously discussed notion of representative reinforcement at work: the Court may have concluded that
the challenged police position, that inventory objectives cannot be realized by merely sealing and storing containers, is entitled to credence
only if the department is prepared to bear the political costs of total
adherence to such a view by henceforth so intruding upon the privacy
of all persons whose vehicles happen to be impounded and
inventoried.

****
Twenty-five years ago, the ABF Survey declared that police should
"reduce their enforcement policies to writing and subject them to a
391. Allen, The Nature of Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Autumn 1984, at 1, 3.
392. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 112.
393. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
394. Caplan, supra note 31, at 503-04.
395. Consider the Blackmun interpretation of Bertine in the later Wells case, quoted in supra
note 114.
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continuing process of critical re-evaluation." 396 With respect to law
enforcement guidelines governing the search and seizure activities of
police, the further assumption was that judicial review of these regulations would occur and would ultimately result in a fourth amendment
jurisprudence which more delicately balanced competing interests.
The point of my assessment is not that such a system of rulemaking
and review with such results is beyond accomplishment. Rather, it is
that the processes of formulating police rules and subjecting them to
meaningful review are not without difficulties, at least some of which
may have either resulted from or accounted for the Supreme Court's
own hesitancy either to stimulate rulemaking or to review challenged
rules. Clearly much remains to be done.

396. W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 513.

